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ABSTRACT 
Chinese elite female athletes have experienced extraordinary success in international 
athletic competitions. Since 1992, elite women athletes have been more represented and 
successful in the Olympics and National Championships then men; while accounting for 
less than 50 percent of the elite athletes in China, and competing in less Olympic events; 
in the Olympics, women were represented in less than 50 percent of the events until 
2012. Concisely, the rise of Chinese female athletic participation and success in 
international competitions has become the backbone for China’s rise to sports relevance, 
and has been unlike historical Western nation-states’ experience in athletics.  
This historical examination chronologically documents the rise of Chinese elite 
female athletes and the policies affecting athletes from 1949 to the present, and reveals a 
connection between female athletic success and state enforced gender equality policies 
that targeted culture, education, and labor. Through gender equality policies, men and 
women were uniformly exposed to a national sports system that invested in research, 
training, equipment, recruitment, and incentivizing athletes “to win honors for the 
country.” Moreover, this examination evaluates various hypotheses on what Chinese 
policies, if any, have produced these extraordinary results, and proposes the sports 
system, although exceptionally successful, is ultimately imbalanced and plateauing, while 
the Chinese Communist Party desires participation, power, and control at the expense of 
possible broad athletic victory.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Mao Zedong declared, “Women hold up half the sky.”1 In modern international 
sports, Chinese women hold up more than half the sky, and women have accomplished 
what men cannot in competitive international sports. For example, in 1988, as women 
events comprised approximately 25 percent of all Olympic events, Chinese female 
Olympic athletes comprised 46 percent of the Chinese Olympic team and accounted for 
60 percent of the Chinese gold medals. Moreover, in 1992, Chinese female Olympic 
athletes comprised 52 percent of the Chinese Olympic team and accounted for 75 percent 
of the Chinese gold medals.2 In 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012, Chinese female 
Olympic athletes comprised 62, 66, 64, 52, and 57 percent of the Chinese Olympic team 
while accounting for 56, 59, 60, 53, and 54 percent, respectively, of all Chinese gold 
medals.  
Concisely, since 1988, more Chinese women have qualified for the Olympics and 
won gold medals than Chinese men. Additionally, Chinese female athletes have achieved 
excellence in World Cup Marathons, World Championships in Athletics, World 
Swimming Championships, World Cup Diving Championships, and have accounted for 
89 percent of all gold medals won in the Winter Olympics (since 1988). Regularly, in 
international competition, Chinese female athletes are more represented (as a ratio of 
women to men) than the industrialized countries of Great Britain, the United States, or 
Germany3 while domestically, between 1978 and 1998, over 60 percent of the Chinese 
top 10 athletes of the year were women.4  
                                                
1 Dong Jinxia, Women, Sport and Society in Modern China: Holding Up More than Half the Sky 
(London: Frank Cass, 2003), 1. 
2 James Riordan and Dong Jinxia, “Chinese Women and Sport,” in Sport and Physical Education in 
China, ed. James Riordan and Robin Jones (London: E & FN Spon, 1999), 162. 
3 Ibid., 159–169. 
4 Jinxia, Women, Sport and Society in Modern China, 220. 
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In view of these consistent results, why have international Chinese female 
athletics (since 1949) risen to prominence and experienced exceptional success? 
Specifically, what Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies have produced the rise and 
success of Chinese female athletics in international competition, and what are the 
possible implications both internationally and domestically? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
An examination of CCP policy and implications towards cultivating successful 
international Chinese female athletics is an examination of the evolutionary effects of the 
CCP’s policies on female physical and social liberation, female social roles and 
responsibilities, broader regime policies toward the international community and 
international sports, and domestic customs, or acceptance of international sports. 
Succinctly, sports do not exist within a void; sports influences and is influenced by 
governmental, social, and personal relationships. For example, female physical and 
societal liberation from the governmental, social, and personal practices of “footbinding” 
or educational exclusion must exist for competitive volleyball, swimming, track and field, 
or gymnastics to exist. Adrian Smith and Dilwyn Porter assert, “Sports supplies a mirror 
that a people holds up to itself.”5 Thus, an examination of the recent history of modern 
Chinese female athletics is an examination of the evolution of the Chinese government 
and society. 
Internationally and domestically, competitive sports foster national identification, 
diversification, globalization, and internationalization as governments and athletes 
participate in cross-cultural competition and transnational organizations like the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC). Moreover, international sports generate 
patriotism, pride, social change, and legitimizes (or delegitimizes) government 
philosophies and policies through athletic performance (success and failure), international 
acceptance, and rule compliance (or non-compliance).6 For example, the domestic mass 
                                                
5 Adrian Smith and Dilwyn Porter, eds., Sport and National Identity in the Post-War World (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 2. 
6 Xu Guoqi, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports 1895–2008 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2008), 2. 
  3 
acceptance of the 1980s Chinese female volleyball team,7 or the 1990s Chinese female 
soccer team (the “iron roses”), fueled patriotism,8 identity, pride, and assisted in 
legitimizing CCP rule while the international mass acceptance assisted globalization, 
respect, and legitimacy through athletic skill and performance. As Guoqi Xu asserts, 
“Sport defines a country’s national identity and internationalization because it inspires 
solidarity and self-reflection.”9 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Broadly speaking, problems with an examination of CCP policy and implications 
towards cultivating successful international Chinese female athletics include negative 
opinions of sports’ significance, a lack of gender studies in sports, a lack of gender-
divided statistics, and a lack of participation of female athletes in gender studies in China. 
For example, historically, Chinese and international gender studies have rarely placed 
importance upon female representation in sports. Chinese female athletes examine and 
are examined for primarily athletic performance-related studies. Further, in China, 
historical sports statistics and sports studies rarely decouple men and women.10 
Therefore, a historical assessment of specific policies toward female athletics, and efforts 
to assess specific motivations to use female athletics as a tool for economic, political, or 
social goals easily becomes intertwined with broad policies like the Great Leap Forward 
(GLF, 1958–1960), female policies like the Marriage Law (1950), and sports policies like 
the Olympic Strategy (1985). 
One female athletic policy hypothesis stipulates that Chinese women’s athletic 
success results from government policies fostering admission, opportunity, equality, and 
general male support towards female athletics and female equality.11 Another female 
athletic policy hypothesis stipulates that Chinese female athletic success is a consequence 
                                                
7 Guoqi, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports 1895–2008, 72. 
8 Ibid., 7. 
9 Ibid., 1. 
10 Jinxia, Women, Sport and Society in Modern China, 2–3. 
11 Ibid., 10. 
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of government and social policies deterring female societal advancement and 
encouraging inequality. Accordingly, women participate in athletics and achieve success 
because a male dominated society deters female advancement in business, politics, 
academics, etc.12 Succinctly, Chinese men have numerous career options while women 
have few—women need to succeed in athletics. Finally, another female athletic policy 
hypothesis stipulates that Chinese women athletes succeed apart from government 
policies. Chinese women are culturally socialized different from men. Traditional 
Confucian values encourage Chinese women to be more obedient and work harder than 
men; therefore, they are culturally more inclined to achieve athletic success.13  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The earliest important academic literature assessing gender, sports, and politics 
(in addition to media) in China is Susan Brownell’s Training the Body for China: Sports 
in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic. Brownell devises an anthropological theory 
through the study of collegiate sports in China that utilizes gender, the body, and the 
nation to explain culture and sports’ importance in culture. The body, or the “body 
culture,” through observable differences (for example, hygiene, manners, health, feelings, 
etc.) determines culture—not knowledge. For example, same sex hand holding in China 
evokes apprehension in Americans because humans are concerned about bodily actions—
not because of yin-yang theories or sexual symbolism. Further, the visceral reaction to 
same sex hand holding is the basis for gender, ethnic, class, or national hatred.14 
Brownell stipulates, first, sport is an expression of a culture, second, power relationships 
determine the body culture, for example, the Chinese walk differently than Americans 
because of differing history and power relationships, and third, competitive sports are 
cultural artifacts as gender, the body, and the nation are on display.  
                                                
12 Susan Brownell, Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 209. 
13 Jinxia, Women, Sport and Society in Modern China, 10. 
14 Brownell, Training the Body for China, 10–15. 
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Brownell’s contribution to the importance of gender, sports, and nationalism in 
China is without question, but the data she addresses mainly concern amateur athletes, 
and her study was conducted before national athletes were granted favored access to 
colleges in the 1990s.15 Therefore, the truly gifted international Chinese female athletes 
and societal relationships remain unaddressed, and consequently, the reasons for Chinese 
female success in international competition remain unaddressed. Further, Brownell’s 
theory of inequality producing superior Chinese female athletes (superior to Chinese 
male athletes), and the disenfranchised women, a subcategory of women, producing the 
most successful athletes, is not substantiated with data.16 For example, statistical data on 
the origins of elite Chinese female athletes are not provided.  
Notably, Brownell predicts political themes, policies, and Western sports are 
largely irreconcilable. For example, she argues that “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” promoting Western sports (or Olympic sports) competition while 
resisting Western political thought is improbable. Therefore, as China further embraces 
Western dominated international competition and the IOC, the Chinese economy, 
politics, and society will further embrace Western definitions of free trade, democracy, 
and human rights.17 
Fan Hong’s Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom: The Liberation of Women’s 
Bodies in Modern China is a historical examination of the evolution and importance of 
physical gender relations, physical female liberation, and sports in China (1840–1949); 
notably, Fan’s historical examination includes Mao Zedong’s philosophies on physical 
education. Through Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom, Fan reveals a traditional 
Chinese culture that physically controlled women in modern China, a women’s 
movement grappling with physical liberation, the relationship between exercise and 
liberation, and the relationship between female participation in sports and freedom from 
traditional patriarchy. Fan’s thesis positing that Chinese female liberation through 
physical liberation links gender, sports, and politics while also revealing the mere 
                                                
15 Jinxia, Women, Sport and Society in Modern China, 2. 
16 Brownell, Training the Body for China, 209. 
17 Ibid., 323–324. 
  6 
participation in sports has paradoxical social consequences. For example, government 
mandated exercise both confirms and denies traditional culture through a redefinition of 
female physicality using patriarchal methods.18 
Fan’s historical archival data present a complex chronological account of both 
Western Christianity’s influence and nationalist and communist political systems 
concerned with tough women to defend the forming Chinese nation-state. Fan overstates 
Western Christian culture’s influence. For example, the relationship between exercise and 
education existed in ancient Greece before Western Christian culture, and the Qing 
Dynasty (Fan examined 1860–94) not promoting baseball (invented in 1895) is congruent 
with Western Christian culture.19 Conversely, Fan provides strong archival data to prove 
that the nationalist and communist regimes promoted exercise, sports, and female 
physical liberation for political agendas of power and survival rather than gender 
equality. Therefore, Fan’s thesis appears accurate while female physical liberation 
appears independent from a Chinese women’s movement. Notably, Fan’s Footbinding, 
Feminism and Freedom is a well documented beginning to Chinese female athletics, and 
contributes to the general knowledge of the interconnectedness of gender, sports, and 
government in China. 
Dong Jinxia’s Women, Sport and Society in Modern China: Holding Up More 
than Half the Sky is a chronological historical examination of the evolution of elite 
female athletics under CCP rule from 1949 to 1998. Women, Sport and Society in Modern 
China provides case studies of elite female athletes in Beijing, Guangdong, and Sichuan 
to show expanding female participation in elite sports, and to argue that international 
Chinese female athletic success is due to recent Chinese history, culture, politics, gender 
relations, and the centralized sports system.20 Dong’s work utilizes Western and Chinese 
sources unavailable to the West (including interviews with Chinese female athletes) to  
 
                                                
18 Fan Hong, Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom: The Liberation of Women’s Bodies in Modern 
China (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 296. 
19 Ibid., 35. 
20 Jinxia, Women, Sport and Society in Modern China, 11. 
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compose a thorough historical examination of gender, sports, and politics from 1949 to 
1998. The historical examination and sources are a valuable resource to academically 
addressing international Chinese female athletics.  
Conversely, Women, Sport and Society in Modern China is a multifaceted 
historical account of modern Chinese female athletics and advances a complicated thesis 
attributing the rise of Chinese female athletic success to innumerable competing 
factors—for example, to Confucianism, the international community, selflessness, drugs, 
drug policy, priorities, development, isolation, and globalization.21 The theories are often 
contradictory; for example, Dong states that Chinese Confucian female athletes are hard 
working and obedient in a centralized system while materialistic and inferior in a 
decentralized system. Therefore, culture matters and does not matter. Decentralization 
promotes materialism, but does not inspire athletic excellence for the sake of materialism. 
Centralization manifested the Chinese sport management system, which is defined as a 
success (by Dong), and the one child policy, which is defined as detrimental to athletics 
(by Dong). Succinctly, the emerging theory (apart from Dong’s stated thesis) is Chinese 
female athletes are successful because of the Chinese economy, centralization, and 
Confucianism. Why U.S. female athletics is successful in a decentralized and Judeo-
Christian culture, or why Soviet female athletics was successful in a centralized, 
socialistic, and atheistic culture are not resolved. Notably, historical examination is 
complex and Women, Sport and Society in Modern China does justice to historical 
complexity as Dong examines female athletics from Mao Zedong to Jiang Zemin with 
exceptional description.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The method for assessing CCP policy and implications towards cultivating 
successful international Chinese female athletics is a chronological historical study 
designed to answer why international Chinese female athletics have succeeded, and, in 
particular, what CCP policies produced the success? Notably, CCP policy and 
implications towards Chinese female athletics unfailingly intertwines with broader 
                                                
21 Jinxia, Women, Sport and Society in Modern China, 224–225. 
  8 
economic, social, and political policies and motivations throughout the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) history. The examination and significance of international Chinese 
female athletics and CCP policies toward international Chinese female athletics does not 
entail an intensive examination of broad policies and motivations, for example, the 
policies and motivations of the GLF, but is an examination of how the broad policies 
largely affected sports and female athletics. For example, did the GLF assist female 
athletic participation? Conversely, specific CCP athletic policies and female athletic 
policies are examined to determine implications—domestically and internationally.  
Chinese women and culture sources examined include Elisabeth Croll’s Feminism 
and Socialism in China, Chinese Women Since Mao, and Changing Identities of Chinese 
Women. Marilyn Young’s Women in China: Studies in Social Change and Feminism, 
Rey Chow’s Woman and Chinese Modernity, Ellen Judd’s The Chinese Women’s 
Movement Between State and Market, and Gail Hershatter’s Women in China’s Long 
Twentieth Century.  
Additionally, Chinese and Western web resources on Chinese women and sports 
employed in the examination include, but not limited to, China Trade in Services, Women 
of China, People’s Daily, The Economist, Sports Illustrated, and The New York Times, 
while the general literature on sports and China employed are Xu Guoqi’s Olympic 
Dreams: China and Sports 1895–2008, Jonathan Kolatch’s Sports, Politics, and Ideology 
in China, and Fan Hong and Xiong Xiaozheng’s “Communist China: Sport, Politics, and 
Diplomacy”. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The recent historical examination of CCP policy and possible implications 
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• The Mao Zedong era 
• The Deng Xiaoping era 
• The Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao era 
• Conclusions and implications for the PRC-CCP, Chinese female athletics, 
and domestic and international relationships 
The Mao Zedong era segment, notably, examines the effects of female liberation 
in the “New China” on female athletics (for example, the 1950 Marriage Law), the effects 
broad CCP policies had on female athletics (for example, the GLF and the Cultural 
Revolution [1966]), and CCP motivations relating to sports, female athletics, and the 
international community, for example, the Chinese sports administration, and “friendship 
first, competition second.”22 The Deng Xiaoping segment, notably, examines reform era 
effects upon sports, athlete surveys, and CCP organization and motivation to female 
athletics and the international community, for example, the Chinese “Olympic Strategy,” 
and “competition first.”23 The Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao era segment examines the post-
Deng Xiaoping reform era to the present, notably, the effects of the growing Chinese 
market reform on female athletics, or the decentralization of professional sports teams 
and the emphasis upon individual sports, and the misuse of drugs in Chinese athletics. 
The conclusions segment summarizes and offers conclusions as to why international 
Chinese female athletics (since 1949) have risen and experienced exceptional success 
through evaluating the various hypotheses while posing possible implications of CCP 
policies and motivations—domestically and internationally.  
Why international Chinese female athletics have experienced exceptional success, 
and what CCP policies have produced the rise and success of Chinese female athletics are 
effectively examined through a chronological historical examination. Upon displaying the 
information chronologically (telling the story), hypotheses and implications are addressed 
with respect to the intertwining of broad policy, female policy, sports policy, and 
implications. Moreover, revealing, since 1949, a connection exists between Chinese elite 
female athletic population and representation in international competition—ultimately 
                                                
22 Jinxia, Women, Sport and Society in Modern China, 220.  
23 Ibid. 
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linked to success—and CCP gender equality policies that targeted culture, education, and 
labor while simultaneously exposing men and women to a hierarchical national sports 
system that invested in research, training, equipment, recruitment, and incentivizing 
athletes “to win honors for the country.”24  
                                                
24 China Trade in Services, “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Physical Culture and Sports, 
China Trade in Services,” August 29, 1995, http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/1995-08-
29/18686.shtml. 
  11 
II. THE MAO ZEDONG ERA 
A. 1949–1957: SOVIET ASSISTANCE, GENDER EQUALITY, ELITE 
SPORTS, AND FEMALE SUCCESS 
In 1950, upon accomplishing the Chinese-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance 
and Mutual Assistance (February 1950), and within the context of Chinese involvement 
in the Korean War (October 1950), and China’s “lean to one side” policy, Soviet athletes 
and experts assisted in constructing the foundation for professionalizing Chinese sports. 
Prior to 1950, the CCP had professed the value of mass sports and exercise, or mass 
participation in sports and exercise to assist national security, economic productivity, 
national cohesion, and individual health. For example, in “On Physical Education” 
(1917), by Mao Zedong, Mao referred to the cultivation of a “physical culture,” and 
stated, “attention should first be given to a child’s physical needs;”25 “[China] is wanting 
in strength. The military spirit has not been encouraged. The physical condition of our 
people deteriorates daily.”26 Further, and similar to Mao, Zhou Enlai related socialist 
construction, national security, and national rejuvenation to the public’s “physique.” 
Remarkably, prior to 1950, the CCP’s emphasis upon mass sports, which assisted in 
creating the “mass organization”27 named the All-China Athletic Federation (ACAF), 
echoed the Kuomintang’s Citizens’ Physical Education Act (1939),28 while the CCP was 
claiming a divergence from the nationalist’s bourgeoisie sports policies that had produced 
the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) in China, and the Chinese athletes in 
the 1932 and 1936 Olympics—the inspiration for director Siu Ming Tsui’s movie 
“Champions” (2008–Hong Kong).29  
                                                
25 Jim Riordan and Arnd Kruger, The International Politics of Sport in the Twentieth Century (New 
York: Routledge, 1999), 49. 
26 Patricia Uberoi, “Body, State and Cosmos: Mao Zedong’s ‘Study of Physical Education’ (1917),” in 
Across the Himalayan Gap: An Indian Quest for Understanding China, ed. Tan Chung (New Delhi: Gyan 
Publishing House, 1998), 121. 
27 Jonathan Kolatch, Sports, Politics, and Ideology in China (New York: Jonathan David, 1972), 98. 
28 Olympic Dreams, 63. 
29 Ibid., 41–48. 
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By August 1950, following the conclusion of the Chinese-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the CCP sent Chinese athletes and coaches 
to examine Soviet schools, training, and administration with the assistance of ACAF’s 
Research Committee while the Soviet Union sent athletes and experts to assist in Chinese 
sports development. Between December 1950 and February 1951, Soviet and Chinese 
teams played 33 basketball games, and Soviet sports experts began teaching at 
universities and schools. Further, the “Ten-Year Teaching Program of Physical Education 
in Soviet Schools,” and the Soviet teaching programs for volleyball, athletics, 
gymnastics, cycling, diving, skating, skiing, basketball, and swimming,30 were translated 
from Russian into Chinese by the ACAF’s “Propaganda and Translation Committee.”31 
Moreover, the eventual central sports authority, specialized training, and early age sports 
professionalization were all Soviet exports rooted in the early 1950s. As Dong Jinxia 
states, “Undoubtedly, Chinese sport benefited greatly from the former Soviet Union’s 
assistance in the early 1950s.”32  
Correspondingly, in 1950, the CCP passed the Marriage Law and was assisted by 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in accordance with communism’s 
professed “socialist liberation of women” ideology.33 The CCP has asserted, “It was not 
until the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 that Chinese women . . . 
finally won their historic freedom,”34 and “Chinese women [now] enjoy equal rights with 
men in all aspects of political, economic, cultural, social, and family life.”35 However, 
apart from CCP assertions, the Marriage Law and socialist liberation of women, although 
assisting in female freedom through banning the marriage of children, concubines, 
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infanticides, and betrothals,36 has become primarily defined as an abolition of barriers to 
female participation in the socialist revolution.37 Therefore, female participation in the 
socialist liberation of women, particularly, economic production and education, was 
paramount.  
Further, in 1950, to accomplish the socialist liberation of women and further 
female participation in the socialist revolution, a Chinese propaganda campaign utilized 
theatre, books, and pamphlets, such as the magazine Women of New China (later named 
Women of China), published by the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), to 
profoundly influence Chinese women. Women of New China articles included, “Stalin on 
the Liberation of Women through Collective Farms,” “Follow the Good Example of 
Soviet Women,” “The Soviet Union’s Today Is Our Tomorrow,”38 and an editorial on the 
Marriage Law in every issue. From 1949 to 1951, and throughout the 1950s, the CCP 
policies and Soviet assisted propaganda on female liberation and participation aided in 
increasing female literacy through educational attendance, and female participation in 
factories, farms, schools, and hospitals, while incidentally influencing the future of 
Chinese female athletics. 
Notably, CCP Marriage Law policies echo the legacies of the national Reform 
Movement (1896), or the “hundred days reform” enacted by Emperor Guangxu of the 
Qing Dynasty.39 Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, representing Chinese bureaucrats and 
intellectuals of the Reform Movement, introduced the anti-“footbinding” campaign and 
female education for national revival.40 By 1912, Guangdong province founded the 
Guangzhou women’s sports school. By the 1920s and 1930s, women were allowed in 
universities while the Sichuan Women’s Musical and Physical Education School, 
Hanyuan Girls’ Primary School, and Sichuan Women’s Physical Education School, were 
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founded. Further, as Dong states, “Guangdong women played volleyball at the Eighth 
Provincial Games of the ‘Old China’ in 1921 . . . Women debuted at the National Games 
in 1922 . . . [and] Yang Xiuquiong, from Guangdong, won five medals at the Tenth Far-
East Games in 1934.”41 Consequently, the CCP with the Marriage Law, propaganda 
campaign, and early sport strategies, while the Kuomintang with the YMCAs and the 
Citizens’ Physical Education Act, are the benefactors and an evolution of Qing Dynasty 
legacies from nearly a half-century ago. 
In 1952, predating China’s First Five-year Plan (1953–1957), the hierarchy and 
centralization of the CCP, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, revealed the creation 
of a formally state controlled centralized National Sports Commission (NSC), which 
incorporated the loosely controlled previous ACAF structure. When the ACAF was 
created in 1949, the CCP required representation in the ACAF for any element in society 
thought to have a concern (major or minor) in “physical culture;” therefore, exemplifying 
the mass sports emphasis prior to the NSC.42 Conversely, with the new commission came 
centralized responsibility to the State Council for Chinese sports organization, 
propaganda, international liaising, a national defense physical culture, individual sports,43 
and a “national sports program.”44 The NSC administered through a general membership, 
standing committee, and secretariat that represented the State Education Committee, the 
National Sports Committee, the All-China Federation of Trade Union (ACFTU), and the 
General Political Ministry of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The NSC consisted of 
four administrative departments (cadres, international liaison, political, and propaganda), 
and eight athletic departments (aviation, ball games, land sports, mountaineering, 
navigation, mass physical culture, and sports competition) with one “specialist in 
physical culture”45 on the NSC Standing Committee—in contrast to the ACAF’s three 
specialists, and a more decentralized structure.  
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First, the State Education Committee was represented on the NSC and below the 
national level to enforce and administer State Council mandated physical education and 
exercise, which ultimately interconnected female social policies and female participation 
in sports. The CCP, within the context of the Korean War, the “sick man of Asia” legacy, 
and the previously stated ideologies on mass sports, mandated students to engage in 
physical instruction on sports, such as volleyball, basketball, athletics, badminton, martial 
arts, soccer, and athletics twice a week. Additionally, students were mandated to engage 
in physical exercise for 90 minutes daily. The NSC instituted the “labor and defense 
program” that incentivized and recruited student athletes for national training and 
provincial elite teams through a national fitness program. City and county education 
departments and teachers were able to inform provincial education bureaus and 
provincial municipal sports commissions of student athletes while customizing a 
student’s extracurricular activities to that student’s talents. Therefore, female populations 
attending schools and universities in extra-ordinary numbers due to the socialist 
liberation of women, and the previously stated Marriage Law that prohibited marriage 
before the age of eighteen, were educated and participating in sports because of CCP 
policies relating to mass sports, physical education, physical exercise, and female 
participation in the socialist revolution. Notably, the “sick man of Asia” image relates to 
the “century of humiliation” and Chinese internal divisions, but during the early 1950s, 
the image may have literally applied and influenced CCP policy as 10 percent of Beijing 
University students experienced lung disease, and over 8 percent of North-East Normal 
University students dropped out due to illness.46 
Second, the ACFTU was also represented on the NSC and below the national 
level to administer sporting activities that interconnected with female social policies and 
female participation in sports. Similar to education, the CCP placed the responsibility of 
administering sporting activities upon the ACFTU. The ACFTU represented 10 percent 
of China’s working population,47 and sports within the trade union could interact with 
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city and provincial trade unions while liaising with city sport committees and provincial 
or municipal sports commissions. By 1955, due to the sporting activities of the ACFTU, a 
Workers’ Games commenced that represented 17 enterprises in six sports, and by 1956, 
the Workers’ Games represented 19 enterprises and over 25,000 sports associations. 
Further, by 1956, over a fourth of the athletes chosen to represent China at the 16th 
Olympic games, which was eventually boycotted due to Taiwan’s admission, came from 
the ACFTU in conjunction with the NSC.48 Therefore, similar to education, female 
populations participating in economic production in extraordinary numbers for the first 
time, were educated and participating in sports due to CCP policies relating to mass 
sports, and female participation in the socialist revolution.  
Third, the General Political Ministry of the PLA was represented on the NSC, or 
perhaps more accurately stated, the PLA initially influenced and administered the NSC. 
Upon the NSC’s creation, PLA officers and soldiers populated the ranks, for example, 
General He Long, a vice premier, administered the NSC,49 Han Fudong administered the 
NSC’s Ball Games Department, and Zhang Zikui administered the NSC’s Competition 
Department. The PLA had experience with modern sports dating back to the late 19th and 
early 20th century,50 and in 1951, with Soviet assistance, the 3,000 soldier PLA sports 
brigades were founded in all six military regions (north, north-east, north-west, east, 
central-south, and south-west) before the NSC. The PLA sports brigades filtered athletes 
into PLA sport teams and into PLA elite sports. Further, the PLA culture of morning 
exercise, isolated training, dormitories, discipline, and sacrifice filtered into the NSC 
through leadership.51 In short, the NSC liaising with the PLA did not substantially 
influence female physical education, female physical exercise, or female participation. 
Further, the PLA, in comparison to the sporting schools, did not substantially contribute  
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elite athletes to the Chinese national team, but the PLA did foundationally influence the 
NSC. One, arguably, witnessed the professionalization and militarization (or military 
“lifestyle”) of athletes through the PLA influence. 
Last, the NSC administered the provincial National Sports Committee. The 
National Sports Committee was responsible for the development of provincial sports 
institutes, provincial sports schools, and the National Training Bureau—previously the 
“Central Sports Training Class.” Combined, the National Sports Committee policies and 
institutions produced the majority of elite athletes during the 1950s. Notably, sports 
schools produce the majority of Chinese international athletes to this day. Further, the 
National Sports Committee, city sports schools, National Training Bureau, city sports 
committees, and sports institutes professionalized coaching and athletics—employing and 
subsidizing coaches and athletes—while institutionalizing the recruitment of talented 
athletes through education and the ACFTU (all products of Soviet influence). The 
pragmatism, centralization, and hierarchy of training, and the recruitment of athletes, 
rapidly manifested national sports teams and poised China, as sports funding increased 
from 1953 to 1958, to experience a degree of success in international athletic 
competition. 
From 1952 to 1958, with Soviet assistance and the NSC, Chinese participation in 
international sports, Chinese elite athletes, and elite female athletes, began to expand in 
numbers and success. By 1956, China had competed in 185 international competitions, 
and was a member of 14 international athletic organizations. The NSC’s sports budget 
had increased from under 10 million yuan in 1953 to over 60 million yuan in 1958, and 
45 sporting fields and seven gymnasiums had been built between 1952 and 1956—from 
1949–1951 seven sporting fields were built. Further, Chinese elite athletes had bettered 
more than 200 national records; notably, new records from Chinese women outnumbered 
new records by men. Cheng Jinkai (male weightlifter) broke a world record, and Shi 
Baoshu (female shot putter) ranked seventh in the world. Remarkably, elite male athletes 
outnumbered elite female athletes in population and events, but female athletic 
successes—including national records and international performance—were outpacing  
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males. For example, elite female athletes improved the national 100-meter sprint and 80-
meter hurdle record by nearly two seconds. High jump was improved by a third of a 
meter, and shot put and javelin improved by over 30 meters.52 
Notably, the motivations of the CCP’s sports policy from 1949 to 1957 eventually 
echoed the motivations of the Soviet Union; thus, the CCP’s sports policy became 
motivated by proving ideological superiority, nation-state superiority, and advancing 
political goals through sports competitions. Initially, as stated, mass sports were 
promoted to assist the Korean War effort and various national rejuvenation goals, or more 
generally stated, mass sports were promoted to “broadly” compete with Western 
capitalist nation-states. Conversely, as exemplified, with Soviet assistance, Chinese 
sports policies began to evolve from a primarily mass sport focused policy to an elite, or 
professional sport focused policy. Further, CCP motivations began to evolve from 
competing with Western capitalist nation-states outside of sports competitions to proving 
the superiority of China and communism, or advancing Chinese nationalism, and 
advancing political goals through sports competition. For example, with an elite sports 
focus and Soviet style motivations, or a Soviet style competition with capitalism through 
sports, China was motivated to advance its “one China” stance (relating to Taiwan) 
through boycotting the 1956 Olympics and the Singapore international table tennis 
competition. As Chinese female table tennis champion Qiu Zhonghui states, “The 
Americans . . . [were] regarded as a ‘political’ match against our enemy.”53  
Collectively, the empirical data between 1949 and 1958 primarily suggests, first, a 
CCP policy evolution from mass sports to elite sports occurred in accordance with Soviet 
assistance, and was exemplified through the creation, administration, and funding of the 
NSC and Chinese participation in international competition. Second, the CCP’s broad 
social policies towards women and mass sports, which occurred before or simultaneous 
to Soviet assistance, were responsible for early female participation in athletics, and 
interconnected to female success in athletics. Last, CCP sports policies were gender 
neutral in promoting athletics, but females, generally, were improving more rapidly than 
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males. For example, men and women populated the same educational, military, and 
economic structures, and men populated these structures in higher numbers than women, 
but female athletes were setting more new national records with fewer athletes than men.  
B. THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD: COMPETITION, INVESTMENT, AND 
UNSUSTAINABLE SUCCESS 
From 1958–1960, in the context of a deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship that 
resulted in the Sino-Soviet split by 1960, and a second Taiwan Straight crisis, the GLF 
was launched by Mao to accelerate China’s socialist construction, modernization, and 
industrialization in an attempt to compete with Western capitalist nation-states, and 
arguably, Soviet revisionism. The USSR disapproved of Mao’s audacity. Further, the 
Soviet Union disapproved of “people’s communes” and ridiculed the communes’ 
haphazard or inexperienced practices of “makeshift” agricultural production acceleration 
(for example, close cropping) and the smelting of iron and steel in “backyard furnaces.” 
Notably, both practices exacerbated the famine experienced during the GLF in the 
people’s communes. However, despite all the failures and unanticipated consequences of 
the GLF in the people’s communes, professional sports thrived. 
For example, in 1958, 85 percent of Chinese children attended school54 while 
counties, schools, factories, neighborhoods, and communes founded nearly 70,000 sports 
schools that trained and educated nearly two million students. Prior to the GLF, 73 sports 
schools existed and 7,000 students were trained and educated at sports schools.55 Further, 
sports investment climbed to over 50 million yuan, and by 1960, sports investment 
totaled nearly 150 million yuan. As sports investment increased, 26 stadiums, 20 sports 
fields, and over 100 swimming pools were built. Notably, “national defense” sports like 
mountaineering and aviation required large investments and the CCP was willing to make 
the investment—for example, 3.6 million yuan was required to prepare a climbing team 
for the Himalayas.56 Concisely, capital flowed into sports through the NSC at rates 
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unseen in the previous decade, and as sports capital increased from 1958 to 1960, 40 
world records were broken annually, women broke 35 event records, the Chinese female 
gymnastics team was ranked sixth in the world, and the Chinese female volleyball team 
was ranked third in the world.57 Moreover, as sports were professionalized, and 
investments and subsidies added, the amount of professional coaches increased while the 
amount of educational institutes devoted to sports training and coaching rose from six to 
thirty.58 Therefore, CCP motivations were well defined during the GLF; competition and 
security were essential to socialist construction, modernization, and industrialization. 
Famines in the communes were less important, and elite sports occupied a forefront 
position in competing with Western capitalist nation-states, and arguably, the Soviet 
Union. 
Culturally, the GLF continued to accelerate female liberation and the redefining 
of “cultural norms” to populate the professional sports ranks. Prior to the GLF, as stated, 
the CCP stressed broad female and youth liberation through female economic 
independence in labor, youth education, and marriage defined as a “comradeship” rather 
than female servitude, but as the CCP internationally competed throughout the GLF, the 
desire to employ all able citizens intensified. For example, young female athletes were 
urged to abandon cultural superstitions, specifically, the Chinese cultural “falsehood” 
relating to the undesirability of sports as an occupation, and assist the CCP’s sports 
competition goals. Notably, the cultural redefinition of professional sports as an 
occupation existed prior to the GLF, but through the Party’s ambitious objectives, was 
intensified during the GLF. Therefore, rapidly observed is the Chinese youth and females 
mobilizing around CCP policies rather than historical cultural norms of Confucianism. As 
Chinese female volleyball player Dong Tianshu stated, “My father, a senior engineer 
specializing in a project on the Yellow River, did not like me to engage in sport . . . [but] 
conditioned by the socio-political climate (equality between children and parents in the 
eyes of the Party) at the time, he could not overtly intervene.”59 
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By the end of the GLF, for the purpose of competition and security CCP policies, 
governing sports institutions, investment, and culture had won considerable successes in 
elite female sports. Primarily, the educational, recruitment, and sports schools system, 
and public acceptance of professional sports, which was dramatically assisted by CCP 
policies toward abandoning cultural norms, had increased the population of elite female 
athletes to over 3,000—one third of all elite athletes were female. Further, in sports that 
both men and women competed, such as shot put, high jump, track, and discus, women 
tended to outnumber men. Secondarily, elite female sports began outperforming elite 
male sports in athletic performance against world ranked teams. For example, the 
women’s basketball team defeated the third ranked Czechoslovakian team, and the 
women’s volleyball team defeated the Soviet Union.60 Notably, the question of why 
women’s athletics are outperforming men’s athletics is not addressed through studying 
the Party’s GLF polices, or the policies prior to the GLF, but the question of how 
women’s athletics began to rise to prominence is addressed. 
The GLF, although primarily positive for Chinese sports and elite female sports, 
did inadvertently have negative effects on Chinese training and Chinese participation in 
international sports competitions. In 1958, within the context of the Party’s desire to 
compete with Western nation-states, the PRC abandoned all participation in the IOC, and 
eight international sports organizations not associated with the IOC due to their 
acceptance of a “two China” policy. Therefore, GLF-CCP policies and international 
politics marred the ability of Chinese athletes to compete truly on an elite international 
level while drawing into question the validity of Chinese claims to world record 
performances. Notably, a similar theme exists in relationship to most GLF claims, as the 
GLF is often referred to as the “great exaggeration.”61 Further, CCP policies within the 
“higher, faster, stronger” climate of the GLF led to “passionate” training rather than 
scientific training. For example, in attempt to gain immediate victories—a legacy 
witnessed throughout the GLF—intensive training sessions were embarked upon. As a 
result, in a 1961 survey, over 50 percent of athletes were injured and over 8 percent of 
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athletes were ill. Ninety percent of all injuries and illness were extracted after 1958, 
which resulted in over 22 percent of athletes being unable to train. In 1958, during one 
Chinese national gymnastic contest alone, 69 injuries occurred.  
After 1961, and within the context of the Sino-Soviet split and a depressed 
Chinese economy due to GLF economic policies that caused 20 million Chinese deaths, 
the CCP’s accelerated sports advancement goals were ended. In 1960, China held 52 
national competitions, but in 1962, merely 21 national competitions were held. In 1961, 
Chinese sports investment plummeted by almost 100 million yuan while 41 percent of 
China’s elite athletes left the sports system. In 1962, the NSC’s leader (General He Long) 
stated that the NSC, due to limited resources, would concentrate on elite sports like 
gymnastics, table tennis, weightlifting, and volleyball, while mass sports, which now 
were synonymous with national defense sports,62 would be the responsibility of 
provincial or municipal administrations. Further, many sports schools practically 
abandoned training while numerous sport schools closed.63 Therefore, the dreams of 
rapid sports advancement, much like the dream of rapid economic advancement, 
disappeared into the reality of ill-conceived GLF policies; notably, revealing the 
interconnected relationship of economics, politics, and sports.  
Collectively, the empirical data from the GLF years primarily suggest that, first, 
mass sports or national defense sports, and elite sports became direct extensions of GLF 
policies to compete rapidly with the Western-capitalist international community and 
secure China. Therefore, a rapid increase in sports investments, sports schools, athletes, 
coaches, and training for reasons of competition and security occurred. Second, the 
CCP’s sports policies, rooted in a motivation for rapid competition and security were, 
again, as in the previous decade, not designed specifically to target female athletics 
although women were directly encouraged by the Party to advance in athletics and elite 
sports due to national objectives and a historical under representation. Further, CCP  
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polices were designed to employee all citizens equally. Last, the Party’s GLF rapid 
advancement in sports desires produced greater results in international competition with 
women’s athletics than men’s athletics, but was, ultimately, unsustainable. 
C. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: ANTI-ELITE SPORTS AND 
FRIENDSHIP FIRST 
By 1965, China’s economy had recovered from the GLF, and the NSC, with a 
renewed focus upon “scientifically” training professional athletes, through technology 
and education, published updated training manuals for 17 sports while devising a new 
ranking system for coaches, athletes, and referees. Moreover, Chinese professional sports 
appeared to have recuperated as sports schools began to flourish with 1,800 sports 
schools educating and training about 140,000 students. China placed first in the New 
Emerging Force Games (1963), set 29 world records (in 1965), and 202 national records 
(in 1965). At the Second National Games (1965), nine world records were set, about 100 
national records were set, and China now was home to five of the world’s top 10 female 
high jumpers. Largely, by 1965, the negative aftereffects of the CCP’s GLF sports 
policies had been reversed, and although less ambitious with less investment capital, the 
post-GLF sports policies by the NSC were producing success and appeared sustainable. 
Conversely, and unbeknownst to the NSC or the majority of elite politicians, Mao’s 
destructive and chaotic Cultural Revolution (1966) was upon the horizon. Notably, and as 
stated, this historical investigation does not entail an extensive examination of broad CCP 
policies like Mao’s Cultural Revolution, but is an examination of how the broad policies 
affected Chinese sports and Chinese female athletics.  
By 1966 (and until 1969), as Mao engaged in power politics against elite Party 
bureaucrats, and sought to advance “Maoism” (Mao’s communist ideology) professional 
sports became a target for the Cultural Revolution. For example, shortly after the Cultural 
Revolution was launched in May 1966, the wall posters campaign was launched,64 which 
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ultimately employed athletes and criticized the NSC.65 By August 1966, the Red Guard 
campaign, populated by China’s youth, was launched to attack the “four olds” (custom, 
culture, habits, and ideas)66 and the “five black categories” (landlords, rich peasants, 
counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists);67 professional sports were attacked 
as a result. Chinese table tennis coach Fu Qifang and Chinese table tennis champion 
Rong Guotuan were charged with spying and driven to suicide because they had lived in 
Hong Kong. About 300 volleyball players were driven into hard labor and “re-
education.”68 General He Long, director of the NSC, was beaten, and eventually, died 
from his wounds.69 Further, by 1968, the NSC was disbanded and the PLA’s General 
Political Department began administering the sports commission while education, 
training, and recruitment were terminated. In 1967, the journal China’s Sports ceased 
publication, and by 1970, the number of professional athletes had fallen to around 6,000 
from over 11,000 in 1965. Moreover, sports investment plummeted to around 25 million 
yuan. Remarkably, while professional athletes decreased from 1965 to 1970, female 
athletes as a percentage of professional athletes increased from around 35 percent to over 
37 percent, and by 1975, female professional athletes comprised about 40 percent of all 
professional athletes.70 
Oddly, during the Cultural Revolution, and directly related to Mao’s Yangtze 
River swim (July 1966), and Mao’s Ming Tombs Reservoir swim (June 1964), a mass 
swimming campaign was ignited. Notably, both swims were politically motivated to 
prove good health, but, arguably, both swims were exaggerated. For example, the 
Yangtze River swim claimed Mao swam 10 miles in 65 minutes, and the Ming Tomb 
Reservoir swim claimed Mao swam for two hours. Therefore, hundreds of thousands of 
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Chinese citizens learned how to swim through People’s Daily articles on swimming 
history and technique during the Cultural Revolution.71 As Kolatch states, “Swimming 
solely for relief from hot weather was frowned upon, and each swimmer was expected to 
grasp clearly the concept of ‘swimming for the sake of revolution.’”72 Eventually, the 
mass swimming campaign appears to have contributed to professional swimming in the 
1980s.73 Additionally, and unrelated to the mass swimming campaign, during the 
Cultural Revolution, an 18-part exercise program gained immense popularity (in 1966) 
through a China’s Sports article entitled “Sports Should Serve the People,” which 
combined exercise with Maoism while assisting in perpetuating (however small) sports 
during the Cultural Revolution.74 
By 1969, the generally damaging aspects of the Cultural Revolution were 
complete as Mao disbanded the Red Guard with the assistance of the armed forces, 
embarked upon a “rustication” program that would displace millions of Chinese youths to 
“re-education” manual labor jobs in the countryside,75 and reestablished sports programs. 
In 1970, as the economy began to improve and sports investments increased, female and 
male professional athletes increased under Mao’s “friendship first, competition second” 
sports policy (which influenced “ping pong diplomacy”).76 By 1972, former Chinese 
table tennis champion Zhuang Zedong began administering the NSC, and over 9,000 
professional athletes populated China’s ranks (up from 6,000 in 1970) while sports 
investment totaled over 100 million yuan. Further, 17 national competitions and 256 
provincial or municipal competitions were conducted (1972), Chinese table tennis 
athletes regained world prominence, and female athletics set 10 out of 14 new national 
records (1971). 
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Notably, “friendship first, competition second,” within the context of the Cultural 
Revolution and “politics in command,”77 was a policy that treated sports as a direct 
extension of politics. Principally, “friendship first” meant that when international athletes 
visited China, they were showered with “mass humanity” before, during, and after 
competition to support CCP international policies like U.S.-China rapprochement.78 For 
example, as U.S. runner Dick Buerkle stated upon competing in China, “I know this must 
be embarrassing for them, and you can tell it hurts, but they keep on clapping.”79 
Conversely, some academics claim that “friendship first” meant Chinese athletes would 
purposefully lose in competitions to advance CCP international political policies, and 
claim superiority (or “save face”) when defeat was eminent. Contrariwise, and relating to 
this claim, “friendship first” appeared to mean neither—as stated, “friendship first” meant 
Chinese athletes would display kindness to advance CCP political policies. 
Quantitatively, Chinese competitive defeats during the Cultural Revolution were mainly a 
result of athletic inferiority—except in table tennis. For example, in 1974 and 1975, 
Chinese athletic performances at the Asian Games and the National Games were poorer 
than pre-Cultural Revolution performances in 1966. In 1974, the women and men’s 
volleyball teams ranked 14th and 15th at the World Championships as opposed to 9th in 
1962. Realistically, Chinese table tennis athletes may have been in a position to lose to 
other nation-states purposefully80 for the purpose of international politics, but arguably, 
beyond table tennis, athletes were merely trying to recover from the negative effects of 
the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, purposefully losing, or claiming superiority through 
defeat for the purpose of international politics, could hardly be defined as a wide-ranging 
policy. Moreover, amicable behavior to befriend nation-states for CCP political purposes 
better matches the reality Chinese athletes found themselves in, and what the Party was 
communicating (although certain exceptions do exist). 
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Collectively, the historical empirical data of the Cultural Revolution primarily 
suggests, first, elite sports and elite competition became a target for destruction during 
the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1969. All Chinese endeavors during the Cultural 
Revolution had political implications, and elite sports and competition were apparently 
associated with one of the “five black categories,” or possibly, bourgeois individualism to 
the Red Guards and Maoists. Therefore, many professional coaches and athletes were 
murdered or “re-educated,” and competitions were suspended or discontinued. Second, 
elite sports and elite female athletes, although occupying a larger percentage of 
professional athletes, receded while no true CCP sports policy existed—as exemplified 
through the lack of sports investment. Further, previous advancements and short-term 
future advancements in elite sports were sacrificed for revolutionary ends. Last, after 
1969, CCP political objectives and a continued, more or less, competition aversion, 
governed elite sports and athletes. 
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III. THE DENG XIAOPING ERA 
A.  ECONOMIC REFORM AND OPENING (1979–1988): ELITE SPORTS, 
COMPETITION, INVESTMENT, AND FEMALE SUCCESS ARE BACK  
Following the death of Mao in 1976, the Party was confronted with a declining 
economy, soaring unemployment, and internal division in the wake of the destructive 
Cultural Revolution policies. Therefore, as the CCP dealt with the remnants of the 
Cultural Revolution, veteran Party leaders previously purged, such as Deng Xiaoping, 
were “rehabilitated” and reinstated, while new policies, such as the “four 
modernizations” posed by Zhou Enlai in 1963 and again in 1975, gained traction. By 
1978, Deng Xiaoping had emerged as the CCP’s principal leader while Hua Guofeng 
remained the chairman of the Central Committee until 1981, and by 1979, through the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping, “economic reform and opening” was inaugurated. Further, 
“friendship first, competition second” was discarded, and the IOC reinstated the PRC, 
while Taiwan remained in the IOC as a PRC “local institution.” Consequently, economic 
reform and opening policies would transform the PRC economy, society, and elite sports 
indefinitely. 
Between 1978 and 1987, and within the context of economic reform, rapid 
growth, evolving CCP policies, and private enterprises81 expanded elite sports investment 
beyond previous boundaries to improve equipment, knowledge, training, and incentives. 
For example, in 1978, sports investment totaled about 253 million yuan, and by 1984, 
sports investment totaled around 600 million yuan and reached one billion in 1988. 
Moreover, the budgets for elite sports teams climbed from around 50 million in 1980 to 
over 150 million in 1985.  
As sport investment expanded, China built over 200,000 modernized gyms and 
sporting fields between 1979 and 1988, while the NSC funded 27 research proposals on 
athletic recruitment, reinstated the previous ranking system, and updated junior training 
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programs. Further, in 1980, the practice of monetarily rewarding successful athletes 
began, and by 1984, a Chinese Olympic gold medalist could expect to receive 8,000 
yuan. By 1988, a gold medal was worth 18,000 yuan, a silver medal was worth 5,000 
yuan, and a bronze medal was worth 3,000 yuan. Remarkably, China’s per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) was around 1,000 yuan in 1988,82 and a bonus for an academic 
in the space shuttle program was 400 yuan.83  
Additionally, in 1984, CCP sports policy expanded to inviting private investment 
in sponsoring elite sports teams, and in 1986, the CCP invited universities to sponsor elite 
sports teams while the NSC shifted the managerial authority for elite sports teams to head 
coaches. Therefore, by 1985 and 1986, many elite sports teams were owned by private 
enterprises or universities, administered by private enterprises, universities, or sports 
commissions, and managed by head coaches.84 Remarkably, Chinese athletes regularly 
were spotted with Coca-Cola bags, or Nike bags and shoes as Western corporations 
began sponsoring Chinese athletes.85 Concisely, the “friendship first, competition 
second” policy of the Cultural Revolution was replaced by a “competition first” or “Elite 
Sport First”86 sports policy that focused on investing in international victories with public 
or private funds through incentives, knowledge, training, and equipment. 
Thus, through expanding sports investments, incentives, training, knowledge, and 
equipment, and with a “competition first” ideology, Chinese sports advanced upon the 
world. For example, in 1979, Chinese female gymnast Ma Yanhong won a world 
gymnastic championship, and Chinese female diver Chen Xiaoxia won the platform 
diving title. In 1980, 26 Chinese athletes competed in the Winter Olympics, and from 
1981 to 1986, the Chinese women’s volleyball team (CWVT) won five world titles (two 
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World Cup victories, two World Women’s Volleyball Championships,87 and a gold 
medal at the 1984 Summer Olympics). In 1983, Chinese female walkers won two world 
titles, and in 1984, China sent 216 athletes (132 males and 84 females) to the Olympics in 
Los Angeles.  
In Los Angeles, China won 32 medals (including 15 gold medals—five by 
females) and placed fourth overall.88 In 1986, at the Asian Games in Korea, China won 
222 medals and placed first overall.89 Concisely, to define CCP elite sports policies 
between 1978 and 1987 a success is an understatement. Elite sports policies had 
accomplished a Chinese dream—to win gold medals and world recognition. On the 1984 
Olympics Deng stated, “Now it looks like the impact and influence of sports are so great 
that they reflect a country’s economy and civilization. They attract and inspire so many 
people. We need to improve our sports.”90 
From 1979 to 1987, apart from the pride and patriotism that Chinese athletic 
success produced in China with the numerous celebrations, articles, posters, and 
photographs praising Chinese athletes, in 1984, the NSC and elite sports transformed due 
to success. For example, in 1985, the Society of Strategic Research for the Development 
of Physical Education and Sport devised the “Olympic Strategy” that would reform 
China’s sports system to “(1) strengthen the NSC leadership, coordination, and 
supervision; (2) establish a scientific training system; (3) improve the system of sports 
competitions; (4) promote traditional Chinese sports and pastimes; (5) promote sports 
science and research; (6) reform the sport and physical education system; (7) emphasize 
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political significance of sport; (8) improve the rewarding system of competitive sport; (9) 
develop flexible policies for international sports competitions.”91  
Ultimately, the Olympic Strategy would hire more coaches (almost 5,000 coaches 
were employed by 1985), and use over 60 percent of Chinese public sports investment on 
elite sports where China perceived a likelihood of winning medals.92 Further, women 
began training with men, which assisted in increasing female representation in 
“culturally” male sports like football and weightlifting, and the CCP decreased the 
number of elite athletes in an attempt to increase the quality. For example, in 1979, 
around 18,000 elite athletes existed in China; by 1992, less than 17,000 elite athletes 
existed. Remarkably, although elite athletes were decreasing during this time period, the 
percentage of elite female athletes was increasing. The principle of “the entire nation is a 
chess board”—indicating, “provinces should concentrate on the sports in which they have 
a chance to win internationally”93—summarizes the Olympic Strategy. Therefore, after 
1984, the enrollment in sports colleges for coaching increased (the enrollment doubled 
from 1983 to 1985), the enrollment in sports schools increased, and student affiliation 
with sports commissions increased.  
Notably, after 1984, parents began encouraging children (male and female) to 
strive towards elite athletics due to the previous success and monetary rewards associated 
with Chinese athletics—business, sport, and film became the preferred professions.94 By 
the 1990s, articles entitled “Coaches and Athletes have Relatively High Social Status,” 
and “Opinions about the Prestige of 100 Occupations” where elite athletes ranked above 
business director, actors-actresses, pop singer, and fashion model, appeared in China 
Sports Daily and China Women’s Daily,95 which arguably, exemplified a beginning of  
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the abandonment of athletes participating in elite sports for just the Party, and an 
embracement of athletes participating in elite sports for personal prestige and monetary 
gain.  
By 1988, in the context of the Olympic Strategy, an increased population of 
student athletes, an increased sports budget (public and private), and mass acceptance, 
patriotism, and admiration of elite sports, China competed in the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, 
Korea. In 1988, the NSC, conservatively, based upon the results of the 1984 Olympics, 
projected Chinese athletes would win 10 gold medals and finish sixth overall while a 
Sports Daily poll revealed the public predicted China would win 20 medals and finish 
fourth overall, but few predicted the staggering defeat of Chinese athletes.96 China 
fielded 273 athletes (149 male and 124 female) and won only five gold medals (Chinese 
female athletes won three) while placing eleventh overall.97 Remarkably, South Korea 
placed fourth.98 Therefore, the CCP’s Olympic Strategy and the “competition first” 
ideology were rapidly under attack.99 The Chinese sports historian Zhao Yu published an 
article entitled “Defeat of the Troops in Seoul”100 that criticized China’s policies and 
performance in the 1988 Olympics. Further, another Chinese writer stated, “[China had] 
sacrificed the whole nation’s physical well-being for our Olympic strategy.”101 
Meanwhile, the CCP and NSC administrator Li Menghua, began to quell the criticism by 
publishing articles in China Sport Daily and China Sport Weekly discounting Zhao and 
claiming his data was fake.102 Further, the NSC allocated one million yuan to 48 research 
projects designed to improve China’s performance in international competition, and 
insure a “1988 Olympics situation” did not occur again. Notably, Chinese athletes of the 
1988 Olympics were severely criticized by the public as sports nationalism became 
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directed at athletes. For example, Yang Xilan of the CWVT was described as 
“heartbroken” from harsh public criticism, which lead Central China TV (CCTV) to 
conclude (in the series Heshang), “China is a nation that cannot afford to lose anymore, 
even in sports.”103 
Collectively, the historical empirical data of economic reform and opening 
primarily suggests, first, as during the Mao era, when elite sports and elite competition 
investments increase in China’s social system, the CCP focuses upon “competition first” 
and success. Consequently, through the social system’s gender equality goals, the state 
increases the number of elite female athletes while producing female athletic success. 
Second, as during the Mao era, when investment money is spent on sports, the Party 
invests in research, training, equipment, recruitment, and incentivizing athletes that 
produces an increase in athletes, sports schools, coaches, and competitive victories. 
Third, and contrary to the Mao era, the NSC’s Olympic Strategy and the partial 
decentralizing of elite teams produced an Olympic and competitive victories focused 
sports policy (on a historical level) that further energized patriotism, but ultimately failed 
at the 1988 Olympics. Last, as during the Mao era, no specific “female sports policy” 
existed where female athletes received preferential recruitment or treatment to advance 
the CCP’s policies or Olympic Strategy. Remarkably, the opposite appears true as 
Chinese female football players lived in worse conditions than Chinese males. However, 
female athletes are increasing as a percentage of elite athletes, and are experiencing 
exceptional success. Arguably, gender equality still motivated CCP social and sports 
policies; for example, equal access to education and labor—or for athletes—facilities, 
coaching, and medical care. 
B. ECONOMIC REFORM AND OPENING ATHLETES: URBAN AND 
ACCOMMODATED 
Apart from CCP policies, in the 1980s and 1990s, and as economic reform and 
opening occurred and evolved in China, surveys on elite athletes who grew up during the 
economic reform period were conducted, for example, Zhong Bingshu’s Performance 
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Capital and Status Attainment: Sport and Social Mobility Among Chinese Elite Athletes. 
The surveys of athletes’ backgrounds assisted in explaining, and possibly, dispelling 
hypotheses on why athletes choose sports. For example, females participate in athletics 
and achieve success because a male dominated society deters female advancement in 
business, politics, and academics, or female athletes, predominantly, came from 
“manual” class backgrounds that physically and mentally socialized them for athletic 
success. Further, the surveys assisted in examining who the majority of Chinese elite 
athletes gaining historic prestige and personal wealth were. Notably, as stated, the data 
does not explain CCP policies, but rather, briefly examines the individual athletes for 
background and motivations. 
First, were the parents of athletes, who grew up during the economic reform 
period, predominantly, “manual,” or peasant workers from the countryside as some 
academics have posed?104 In 1986, Cynthia Hasbrook concluded, “a lower social class 
background may serve as a barrier to sport participation,”105 and Zhong Bingshu’s 
findings on PRC athletes confirmed Habrook’s conclusions—even in a communist 
nation-state. About 30 percent of all Chinese female athletes’ fathers came from the 
peasant class. About 20 percent of all Chinese male athletes’ fathers came from the 
peasant class. Further, except for judo, wrestling, boxing, fencing, weightlifting, cycling, 
sculling, and yachting, Chinese athletes tended (over 50 percent) to come from 
households in which the father was college educated. In volleyball, basketball, and 
football, nearly 80 percent of female athletes came from households in which fathers had 
a college education, and in table tennis, badminton, and tennis, nearly 100 percent of 
male athletes came from households in which fathers had a college education. The only 
sports with a significant number of athletes from the peasant class and with fathers who 
had not received a college education were weightlifting, sculling, and cycling. 
Additionally, by the 1980s, the majority of men and women athletes were from urban 
environments. Nearly 100 percent of all athletes in table tennis, badminton, volleyball, 
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basketball, figure skating, gymnastics, diving, shooting, and football came from cities. 
The only sports with a significant number of athletes from the countryside were 
weightlifting, sculling, and cycling.106 Therefore, the majority of Chinese athletes came 
from an urban and non-peasant background. 
Second, based upon stated Chinese athletes’ quantifiable demographics, what is 
deducible pertaining to individual athletes’ motivations and success? Although some 
athletes were, undoubtedly, motivated by the desire to escape peasant labor in the 
countryside,107 the majority of elite athletes choose sports apart from the desire to escape 
peasant labor in the countryside. Further, the idea that Chinese athletes succeeded 
because of their peasant background, for example, working in manual labor made 
Chinese athletes better athletes,108 is the exception rather than the rule. Although some 
athletes attribute their success to their peasant background—for example, 1992 female 
Olympic 20 kilometer walking champion Ching Yuening believed running to school 
assisted in her success in walking—the majority of athletes were recruited before the age 
of 13 and from urban environments with resources like education, gyms, pools, and 
coaching, and parents with stable incomes.109 Therefore, the motivations of athletes 
becomes more complex than escaping manual labor in the countryside, and success 
becomes more associated with access to sports knowledge, equipment, training, and 
coaching. Further, with the majority of Chinese athletes coming from urban backgrounds 
with college-educated fathers, the career options becomes more complex than athletes 
choosing elite sports because sports was the only choice, or the only means to “freedom” 
and escape from the countryside. 
Third, what did Chinese elite athletes do with their abilities, prestige, and 
monetary gain? In the late 1980s, as Chinese athletes experienced success, they began to 
seek prestigious post-sports careers upon retirement. Therefore, the NSC began giving 
job priority to Olympic or world medalists, and about 40 percent of elite athletes became 
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coaches or sports commission officials—an occupation that ranked higher in prestige 
than business director, or actor-actress.110 Additionally, about 15 percent of Chinese elite 
athletes migrated to offered jobs in foreign nation-states while other athletes accepted 
club memberships, scholarships, and marriage proposals to migrate to foreign nation-
states. For example, Chinese female table tennis champion He Zhili married a Japanese 
citizen to migrate to Japan, and later defeated her former teammates at the Asian Games 
while playing for Japan.111 Chinese female tennis player Hu Na received political asylum 
from the United States.112 Chinese female table tennis players, Chen Jing and Ji Baoxian 
migrated to Taiwan and Hong Kong, and competed against China in the Asian Games 
and World Championships. By the late 1980s, even with NSC jobs and bonuses, the 
situation with migrating Chinese athletes (called “overseas troops”), some returning and 
some finding permanent residence, became so extensive the CCP issued a directive 
stating that athletes must be over 26 and receive NSC permission to travel for extended 
periods of time to foreign nation-states. 
Collectively, the survey and historical data primarily suggests, first, during the 
economic reform and opening period, Chinese elite athletes come from predominantly 
urban and educated families—with a few sports serving as the exception. Second, athletic 
success is more linked to the availability of sports knowledge, equipment, training, and 
coaching than the physical and mental stress of the peasant lifestyle. Third, generally 
(over half), Chinese athletes are using athletic success and the prestige and monetary 
rewards to secure post-sports careers in coaching, the NSC, or migrating to foreign 
nation-states. “Competition first” and international sports in China were establishing an 
individualism in sports, on a scale, historically not experienced. Chinese athletes were 
becoming more attached to competitive victories, accommodation, and post-sports 
stability, and less attached to the Party.  
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IV. THE JIANG ZEMIN AND HU JINTAO ERA 
A. MARKET REFORM AND FEMALE SPORTS: DECENTRALIZATION, 
INDIVIDUAL SPORTS, AND FEMALE SUCCESS 
By 1989, economic reform had produced both astonishing achievements like 
China’s performance at the 1984 Olympics, and disappointing results like China’s 
performance at the 1988 Olympics. Sports nationalism had rallied the Chinese population 
behind the NSC’s Olympic Strategy, and had produced a devastating backlash through 
Chinese defeats; for example, Zhao’s anti-elite sports publications, Chinese outrage at the 
CWVT’s defeat in the 1988 Olympics, and the “5.19 Soccer Riot in 1985” when the 
Chinese men’s football team lost to Hong Kong.113 As Su Xiaokang in The River Elegy 
stated, “When the five-star flag rose, people began to jump and cry. But what if they lose 
the match? People would swear, smash and make trouble.”114 Further, the CCP’s 
economic reform and Olympic Strategy had inconsistently stressed a combination of 
politics and sports, or sports as a political tool to prove economic and civilization power, 
and decentralization and opening. Therefore, elite athletes became both political figures 
that excited patriotism, and meritocratic actors consumed with individual victories, 
accommodation, and post-sports stability. Athletes became both burdened with the CCP’s 
political objectives like winning Olympic medals for Chinese nationalism, and consumed 
by sports victories; for example, athletes began using performance-enhancing drugs 
(PEDs) in the 1980s,115 and abandoned their education to achieve victories.116 
Ultimately, the emerging market economy would lead to further decentralization and 
reform, and the undeniable rise of the Chinese elite female athlete. 
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By 1990, following the Tiananmen Square crisis and tensions with the West, 
China hosted the Asian Games and won 341 medals117 while continuing the legacy of 
economic reform and opening in concentrating, primarily, on the Olympics. Notably, in 
1989, the previously mentioned ACAF, a non-governmental affiliate to the NSC, began 
to address the sport system failures of “satisfy[ing] the needs of the people in terms of 
leisure and cultural life . . . [and] suit[ing] the development of the socialist mark 
economy”118 while addressing the educational deficiency amongst professional athletes. 
The NSC responded with the “Combine Elite Sport with the Education Sector” seminar 
and the “Regulations on School Physical Education” declaration that sought to improve 
athletes’ education, mass sports, and decentralization. However, by 1991, the NSC was 
more entrenched in the Olympic Strategy than mass sports. In 1991, the NSC labeled 16 
sports like track and field, swimming, and gymnastics as “key Olympic sports” that 
would receive preferential investment and training.119 Moreover, the 1991 National 
Games were postponed to 1993 because the NSC believed Chinese athletic success 
during the 1987 National Games deterred focus from the 1988 Olympics. In 1993, the 
NSC directed the National Games to compete only in Olympic sports or martial arts, and 
by 1994, the NSC had reduced the number of professional athletes from 17,000 to around 
13,000 with approximately 92 percent in Olympic sports. Further, individual sports 
received preferential treatment and the number of professional athletes in track and field, 
swimming, table tennis, shooting, gymnastics, badminton, and cycling were not reduced 
as much as basketball, volleyball, and football. Notably, the number of Chinese athletes 
increased in handball and weightlifting. Concisely, in the early 1990s, the NSC, with the 
help of the ACAF, understood the deficiencies of China’s sport system, and sought to 
improve the system, but ultimately, became more deeply entrenched in China’s focus 
upon Olympic success, particularly, in individual sports—although an increase in mass 
sports and mass exercise was witnessed during the 1990s. 
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In 1992, amidst the rising cost of sports and the partial decentralization of the 
1980s, the NSC devised the previously stated extension to the Olympic Strategy that 
concentrated on individual sports. Moreover, the NSC further decentralized team sports, 
and would eventually dissolve into the State General Administration of Sports (SGAS) by 
1998. Notably, the SGAS would continue the NSC’s close ties with the ACSF and the 
Chinese Olympic Committee. In 1992, the Chinese Football Association (CFA), 
prompted by the NSC, became the first club system with professional league 
competitions. The club system became a market-oriented sport system with registered 
players (Chinese and foreign), advertisement, ticket fees, and sponsorships. The 
government invested in the CFA, but primarily, the 10 million yuan annual budget came 
from private investment. By 1995, Chinese basketball, tennis, and volleyball had formed 
club systems like the CFA, and eventually, the NSC administered a comprehensive sports 
reform and decentralization that established professional sports as “public entities instead 
of government or Party agencies.”120 Further, in the mid 1990s, the elite sports 
department of the NSC was disbanded, 41 sports associations (comprised of 56 sports) 
affiliated to 12 administrative departments, 23 sport competition management centers, 
and 19 service institutions came into existence—a sports system structure that presently 
endures.121 
Additionally, the Law of the PRC on Physical Culture and Sports, and the “Plan 
for Olympic Glories” (from the Chinese Olympic Committee) assisted the NSC and the 
forming SGAS through providing a legal framework for sports, and a strategy, while 
NSC budget bargaining became both a means of control and decentralization. First, in 
1995, the Law of the PRC on Physical Culture and Sports stated, “Measures for the 
administration of local comprehensive sports games and local individual sports 
competitions shall be formulated by the local people’s governments;”122 therefore, 
historically establishing the legal authority of local governments, provinces, and cities to 
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manage and administer sports activities within their jurisdiction, and beyond State 
Council control. Notably, although the Law of the PRC on Physical Culture and Sports 
historically took steps to decentralize sports, much of the law on competitive sports 
continues the legacy of the NSC in professional sports. For example, the state will control 
registration, participation in international competition, the National Games, athletic 
records, promote mass sports, and “win honors for the country.”123  
Second, in 1995, the NSC and the Olympic Committee released the new “Plan for 
Olympic Glories,” which established, “(1) [the] restructuring [of] . . . elite sport training 
and management; (2) enhancing the elite athlete delivery pipeline and system [including 
sport school]; (3) maintaining the nation’s leading position in world sport competition, 
particularly the Summer Olympic Games.”124 Ultimately, the “Plan for Olympic 
Glories,” by 1996, was revealed as an aggressive NSC investment program that included 
65 million yuan for Olympic related special projects to athletic facilities, research, and 
health. Over 200 academics would research 56 projects while twice the number of 
necessary athletes (over 960 athletes) had been recruited and trained for the Olympics. As 
Dong states, “Although the details of the investment for the 1996 Olympic Games are not 
available, it has been alleged that the expenses were double of those for the games four 
years earlier.”125 
Third, the NSC, and in due course the SGAS, through the ACAF and the affiliated 
Chinese Athletic Association (CAS) began budget negotiations (beyond private 
investment) with provinces and local sports commissions. As stated, the Law of the PRC 
on Physical Culture and Sports established the legal authority of local governments, 
provinces, and cities to manage and administer sports activities, but to maintain athletic 
excellence in the mixed (hierarchical but decentralizing) sports system, the CAS began 
budget negotiations on training and performance quotas. Providences and local 
commissions were not forced to sign agreements with the state through CAS, but to 
receive training and performance money, the providences were compelled to bargain. For 
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example, if provincial local sports commissions projected an athlete would win an 
Olympic gold, the state would pay the local sports commission 100,000 yuan (60,000 
yuan for a silver projection, and 30,000 yuan for a bronze projection). If the projected 
victory did not occur, the local sports commission would be compelled to pay all, or a 
percentage, of the investment received back to the state.126 Further, based upon Olympic, 
Asian Games, and World Championships contracted performance quotas with sports 
commissions, CAS devised the training budgets received by the commissions. Therefore, 
the state budgeting mechanism evolved beyond mere socialism, but not to laissez faire 
capitalism—the budget awarded the provinces the ability to govern centralized control 
while awarding the state a means of still exhibiting control.  
By 1998, although rewarding more autonomy to associations, provinces, and 
cities, and through management and budgeting, the newly formed SGAS, like the NSC, 
exerted a degree of hierarchical control over sports in China. As stated, the SGAS 
liaisons with the ACAF and the Chinese Olympic Committee to devise athletic strategy, 
development, budgeting, and implementation. The SGAS was tasked with “(1) creating a 
national sports framework; (2) promoting physical activity and exercise participation in 
schools and local and regional communities; (3) organizing national sporting events; (4) 
organizing international sporting events in China; (5) enforcing antidrug and 
anticompetitive measures; (6) liaising and cooperating with Hong Kong, Macau, and 
Taiwan; (7) supporting research into the development of sport; (8) implementing 
regulations governing the sport industry, sport market, and sport-related business 
activities; (9) implementing national physical training standards and supervising public 
health in coordination with the Ministry of Health; (10) overseeing sport activities with 
foreign associations and teams, and sport-related cooperation and communication with 
countries and regions outside the mainland.”127 Further, the SGAS, with an 
overwhelming focus upon elite sports, produced professional athletes for international 
competition through a system starting at the district bureau with sports schools, and 
moving through the city and provincial bureaus to the national level. 
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Ultimately, the athletic institutional reform of the 1990s, which endures to the 
present, monumentally, produced female victories in international athletics. For example, 
by 1992, Chinese women in the Olympics outnumbered Chinese men (132 to 118), and 
won 12 of the 16 gold medals. Notably, the athletes received 80,000 yuan for a gold 
medal, 50,000 yuan for a silver medal, and 30,000 yuan for a bronze medal. Gymnast Lu 
Li received a one million yuan sponsorship, and at auction, a gold medal was worth over 
600,000 yuan. Further, in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012, Chinese female Olympic 
athletes comprised 62, 66, 64, 52, and 57 percent of the Chinese Olympic team while 
accounting for 56, 59, 60, 53, and 54 percent, respectively, of all Chinese gold medals. 
Since 1988, Chinese female athletes have accounted for 89 percent of all Winter 
Olympics medals, have won China’s (and Asia’s) only tennis Grand Slam (2011), and 
have won China’s only major golf tournament (2012). Notably, Chinese male golfer 
Guan Tianlang may have been the youngest male player to qualify and make the cut at 
the 2013 U.S. Masters in Augusta, Georgia, but he is eight professional wins, including 
one major golf tournament victory, and is over five years behind his counterpart Chinese 
female golfer Shanshan Feng. Additionally, the Chinese Women’s Football Team 
(CWFT) has placed second at the World Cup (1999), won silver at the Olympics (1996), 
and won eight Asian Cups. Concisely, elite female athletics have done exceptionally well 
in the 1990s institutional reform era and beyond. 
Notably, although the CWFT experienced success in the 1990s, decentralization, 
and an emphasis upon individual sports by the NSC and SGAS produced competitive 
failures in international team sports. For example, the Chinese Women’s Basketball 
Team (CWBT) dropped from second in the 1992 Olympics to ninth in the 1996 Olympics 
to not qualifying for the semi-finals in the 2012 Olympics. In 2000, the CWBT did not 
qualify for the Olympics, and in 2004, did not qualify for the quarterfinals. The CWFT 
dropped from second in the 1996 Olympics to not qualifying for the semi-finals in the 
2000 and 2008 Olympics to not qualifying for the Olympics in 2012. Additionally, in the 
1990s, although the CWFT had placed second in World Cup and Olympic competitions, 
the team received less sponsorship, less pay, and less public interest than the Chinese 
Men’s Football Team (CMFT). CMFT has qualified once for the World Cup (2002), but 
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has never scored a goal in World Cup competition, and has qualified once for the 
Olympics (2008) due to host nation automatic qualification, but has never won a match in 
Olympic competition. Further, the CWVT dropped from world champions in the 1980s to 
seventh in the 1992 Olympics to losing in the quarterfinals to Japan in the 2012 
Olympics. Notably, in the 1990s, the number of professional team athletes decreased by 
40 percent from the 1980s, and the number of professional team coaches decreased by 28 
percent. 
Collectively, the historical data primarily suggests, first, during the current era in 
Chinese elite sports, non-governmental federations, committees, providences, sports 
associations, and local sports commissions, are increasingly responsible for producing 
revenues, and liaising with private and public administrations for budgeting and 
competition quotas. Second, although Chinese elite sports are decentralizing, the legacy 
of hierarchical control persists due to state functions in sports, for example, registration, 
research projects, budgeting, and the new Olympic strategy that focuses upon individual 
sports. Third, state support and investments in training, research, coaching, recruitment, 
and education are still linked to competitive success. For example, as the NSC or SGAS 
focused investment upon individual sports at the expense of team sports, the performance 
of elite teams declined. Last, empirically, the current era remains consistent with previous 
eras in that the CCP’s sports policies were not designed specifically to target female 
athletics, although females are encouraged by the Party to advance in athletics and elite 
sports. A comprehensive preferential female sports policy is indiscernible as Chinese 
female athletes are more represented in international competition (for China) while less 
represented as a percentage of Chinese professional athletes and coaches (in China) than 
men.128 Providences and commissions “widely” produced athletes, both male and female, 
for maximum representation and investment capital,129 but women through qualifications 
are filtering to international competitions, and succeeding at international competitions 
more significantly than their male counterparts. 
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B. DO THE CHINESE WIN BECAUSE THEY USE PEDS? 
During the 1990s and beyond, PEDs have cluttered academic research on the 
effectiveness of China’s hierarchical national sports system and training. For example, 
has the hierarchical sports system been effective in producing elite athletes through 
scientific training, research, and recruitment, or has the sports system merely appeared 
effective due to PEDs? As stated, the practice of prescribing Chinese athletes PEDs 
began during the Deng Xiaoping era and economic reform and opening, but arguably, 
became a universal issue in 1998 during the Jiang Zemin era, when Chinese female 
swimmer Yuan Yuan was caught with 13 vials of Human Growth Hormones (HGHs) in 
the Sydney airport.130 Consequently, in the 1990s and beyond, as exemplified during the 
2012 Olympics with Chinese female swimmer Ye Shiwen’s PED allegations, arguably, 
because her 50-meter freestyle time was faster than U.S. gold medalist Ryan Lockte,131 
questions persistently arise as to how far reaching PEDs are in Chinese athletics. Do the 
Chinese win because they cheat? Notably, age scandals exist in female gymnastics, but 
due to only involving one sport and never receiving a conviction by the IOC, is not 
addressed by this examination.  
In 1968, the Summer and Winter Olympics began administering drug tests, by 
1972, “full-scale” testing was administered, and by 1988, athletes were continually 
disqualified for drug use, for example, Canadian track and field gold medalist Ben 
Johnson.132 Therefore, in 1989, China announced an anti-drug policy that focused upon 
“strict prohibition, strict examination, and strict punishment,”133 but in 1990, when 165 
Chinese athletes were examined and 1.82 percent tested positive for PEDs, the athletes 
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were neither punished nor exposed. Remarkably, from 1990 to 1998, nearly half of the 
world’s positive PED tests in swimming came from China.134  
In 1992, a state sponsored Anti-Doping Commission was devised by the NSC, 
and in 1993, 1.56 percent of all Chinese athletes examined by the commission tested 
positive for PEDs, but the first exposure and punishment did not occur until 1994—nine 
coaches, five from swimming, and 24 athletes were suspended. Notably, 1.3 percent of all 
global athletes examined by the IOC tested positive for doping in 1993. At the 1994 
Asian Games, 11 Chinese athletes (seven from swimming, two from canoeing, one from 
cycling, and one from track and field) tested positive for PEDs,135 and by 1995, the 
Chinese swimming team was not allowed to compete in the Pan-Pacific Swimming 
Championships while the International Swimming Federation (FINA) began investigating 
China.136  
Further, in 1995, following the 1994 Asian Games PED scandal, the previously 
stated, Law of the PRC on Physical Culture and Sports, included two articles (Article 34 
and Article 50) on drug testing and punishment while NSC director Wu Shaozu 
announced the “Four Nos and Five Unsuitables.” Wu Shaozu stated, “(1) No drugs even 
if it means no gold medals. (2) No drugs even if others use them. (3) No drugs even if 
they are not detectable. (4) No drugs even if other people allow you to use them. Drug 
use does not suit (1) Marxism-Leninism, (2) socialism, (3) the people’s best interests, (4) 
the athlete’s best interests, or (5) the nation’s best interests.”137 However, in 1997, 24 
Chinese athletes tested positive for PEDs, and 18 of 24 positive PED cases were women 
from track and field and weightlifting. By 1998, as stated, Chinese athletes and PEDs 
were universally connected causing National Athletic Center director Duan Shijie to 
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state, “If drug abuses occur again in athletics, especially in the Ma Family Army, China’s 
sport would collapse. This is not an exaggeration.”138 
Irrespective of Chinese shame, or the Western media’s excessive attention upon 
China’s PEDs test failures,139 PEDs existed in certain sports at higher percentages than 
global athletes. Therefore, the NSC took measures to diminish PEDs in Chinese sports, 
while ultimately, reducing Chinese success in certain sports. First, generally, PEDs usage 
existed in Chinese swimming, track and field, cycling, and weightlifting—proved by the 
athletes testing positive for PEDs. Further, success in “power” sports like swimming, 
canoeing, or weightlifting could be assisted by PED usage while “coordination” sports 
like badminton, gymnastics, table tennis, diving, or shooting had essentially no use for 
PEDs.  
Second, after the 1998 Yuan Yuan HGH scandal, the SGAS began aggressively 
testing athletes. For example, conducting 317 blood tests in 1998, and amidst FINA 
pressure in 1999, the SGAS conducted 646 tests on Chinese swimmers.140 In 2000, 27 
Chinese athletes, six from the Ma Family Army, which is discussed later, and 13 Chinese 
coaches were banned by the SGAS from the 2000 Olympics while the SGAS established 
a predominantly “drug-free” legacy through strict testing and punishment that has 
drastically reduced the amount of Chinese PED scandals since 1998. Further, Chinese 
national weightlifters are tested once a month, and before the Olympics, all athletes are 
tested—some with an advanced blood test developed to detect Erythropoietin (EPO)—
EPO increases red blood cells and oxygen transport.141 
Third, undoubtedly, the diminishment of PEDs in Chinese power sports like 
swimming, track and field, and cycling, has generally reduced China’s success in power 
sports—weightlifting remains the exception. For example, at the World Championships 
in 1991, Chinese swimmers won four gold medals. At the Olympics in 1992, Chinese 
swimmers won four gold medals, and at the World Championships in 1994, Chinese 
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swimmers won 12 gold medals. Conversely, at the Olympics in 1996, Chinese swimmers 
won one gold medal, at the World Championships in 1998, Chinese swimmers won three 
gold medals, and at the Olympics in 2000, Chinese swimmers did not win a gold medal. 
At the Asian Games in 1998, Chinese swimmers ranked below the Japanese, and at the 
World Athletics Championship in 1999, China won one gold medal in the 20-kilometer 
walk. Further, at the Olympics in 2008 and 2012, China won one and five gold medals in 
swimming, respectively, while winning zero and one gold medal in track and field. 
Therefore, the numbers tell the story, in the 1990s, when China won numerous medals in 
swimming and track and field, PED testing was minimal (if conducted at all). After 1998, 
strict PED testing has dramatically reduced the number of Chinese medals in swimming 
and track and field. Additionally, during the 1990s, international sports organizations 
administering PED tests revealed Chinese athletes were using PEDs more than other 
nation-states. 
Do the Chinese win because they cheat? As proven, historically, in swimming and 
track and field, China has won due to the assistance of PEDs. For example, China’s 
swimming success in the 1994 World Championships, where China won 12 gold medals. 
China’s track and field success in the 1993 International Association of Athletics 
Federations (IAAF) World Championship in Athletics, where China won four gold 
medals (three by the Ma Family Army), second to the United States—all experienced 
before strict SGAS PED testing and international pressure. However, power sports like 
swimming, track and field, canoeing, rowing, cycling, and weightlifting, if weightlifting 
is subtracted because Chinese weightlifters win regardless of PED usage, accounted for 
four gold medals, out of 51 gold medals, or 8 percent of China’s gold medals in the 2008 
Olympics. Notably, with weightlifting, power sports accounted for 12 gold medals, or 23 
percent of China’s gold medals. In the 2012 Olympics, power sports, if weightlifting is 
subtracted, accounted for 15 percent of China’s gold medals, and with weightlifting, 
accounted for 28 percent of China’s gold medals. Further, in the 2008 Olympics, China 
won 51 gold medals while the second place nation-state (the United States) won 36 gold 
medals, and in the 2012 Olympics, China placed second with 38 gold medals while the 
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third place nation-state (Great Britain) won 29 gold medals. Concisely, without power 
sports, China’s standing would have remained first (in 2008) and second (in 2012).  
Historically, China has had impressive showings at the Olympics through athletic 
performances in diving, gymnastics, table tennis, badminton, shooting, and weightlifting. 
For example, in the 2012 Olympics, diving, gymnastics, table tennis, badminton, 
shooting, and weightlifting accounted for 71 percent of China’s gold medals. Therefore, 
since the 1990s, sports assisted by PEDs, and sports involved in Chinese PED scandals, 
have had minimal effect upon China’s world Olympic standing—China does not need to 
cheat to win. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. WHY DID CHINESE ELITE FEMALE ATHLETES RISE AND 
SUCCEED? 
Since 1949, historical data have continually connected China’s elite female 
athletic population and representation in international competition to CCP gender 
equality policies that targeted culture, education, and labor. These policies 
simultaneously exposed men and women to a hierarchical national sports system that 
invested in research, training, equipment, recruitment, and incentivizing athletes “to win 
honors for the country.”142 Generally, with few exceptions, under the Party’s social 
system and hierarchical sports system, when national sports investment increased the 
population and success of elite female athletes in international competition increased. 
When national sports investment decreased the population and success of elite female 
athletes in international competition decreased. 
One hypothesis posits that Chinese female athletes succeed apart from 
government policies. According to this view, women are culturally socialized different 
from men. Confucian values encourage women to be more obedient and work harder than 
men, and women are therefore culturally inclined to achieve athletic success. This view 
does not hold up. First, the data indicates that Chinese female elite athletes succeed in 
relationship to government policies rather than apart from government policies. For 
example, as CCP sports investments advanced research, training, equipment, and 
recruitment during the heyday of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the GLF, the number of 
elite female athletes increased and women began to succeed in competition. During the 
Cultural Revolution, as sports investments decreased and the Red Guard targeted the 
NSC, the number of female athletes decreased and women failed to succeed or compete 
in competition. Moreover, during the Deng Xiaoping era, as the CCP increased  
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investments, Chinese women and teams, like the CWVT, experienced success. During 
the Jiang Zemin era, as the NSC decentralized team sports and investments were 
diminished, the CWVT was less successful in competition.  
Second, CCP policies were not Confucian. Notably, the assertion of a “Confucian 
Hypothesis” is not an in-depth examination of Confucianism, but rather, a questioning of 
the significance of Confucianism in a nation-state and culture in which data suggest the 
Party sought to alter traditional habits, for example, the Anti-Confucian Campaign 
(1973–74). Confucianism stresses, “[the] home [was] a microcosm of the state,”143 and 
“Five Relationships [exist] . . . ruler/subject, parent/child, husband/wife, elder sibling/younger 
sibling, and friend/friend,”144 where each relationship, with the exception of friend/friend, 
are hierarchical in nature, and women are “required to obey their fathers . . . obey their 
husbands . . . and as widows . . . obey their grown-up sons.”145 Since 1949, data indicates 
that CCP social, education, and sports policies are not Confucian. For example, the 1950 
marriage law, mass sports, and the “socialist liberation of women,” stressed gender 
equality in labor, marriage, sports, and education—not hierarchical Confucian norms. 
Women were incentivized to rebel against the state during the Cultural Revolution, 
women were incentivized to gain economic independence from their husbands, and 
women were incentivized to disobey the desires of their parents to compete in sports for 
the Party. Remarkably, without the CCP’s un-Confucian policies of marriage, education, 
and labor equality, the NSC might not have been capable of exposing women to training, 
equipment, recruitment, or the national sports system.  
Third, undoubtedly, remnants of Confucian culture existed in Chinese elite 
women sports, but the data questions the significance of Confucian culture in 
international competitive success. It may be argued further that CCP socialist ideology 
and policies do not exemplify Confucian culture, but the hierarchical national sports 
system, and the “spirit,” obedience, or work ethic of women, do exemplify Confucian 
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culture and produce athletic success. Data do indicate that the CCP bureaucracy and the 
national sports system were hierarchical and remain generally hierarchical, but over 
emphasizing the hierarchical national sports system or the hierarchical coach-athlete 
relationship places sports in a void. It discounts the rampant abandonment of Confucian 
culture in Chinese relationships that affect sports. For example, CCP policies on gender 
equality in labor and the ability of women to gain economic independence affected 
athletic migration during the Deng Xiaoping era.  
Notably, apart from the possible difficulties in measuring women’s obedience and 
hard work to men’s obedience and hard work, if Confucian women were more prone to 
athletic success because of obedience and hard work, then the same phenomenon may be 
expected in the Confucian cultures of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Contrary to China, in 
2012 the Republic of Korea (ROK) fielded 248 athletes, 113 women, and 135 men for the 
Summer Olympic, and Korean men won eight of 13 gold medals. In 2004, Chinese-
Taipei fielded 50 men and 39 females, and both genders won one gold medal. Examples 
can be found to disprove the Confucian hypothesis in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Further, 
this thesis’s examination of Chinese elite female athletics is not a comparative 
examination, but the data do suggest an explanation not focusing upon Confucianism is 
more useful. 
Typically, proponents of the Confucian Hypothesis cite the work ethic and 
obedience of the Liaoning Women’s Running Team, named the Ma Family Army after 
their coach Ma Junren, as an example of how hard work and obedience displayed by 
Chinese women produces success. Ma, a former PLA soldier who possessed a primary 
school education, had attended a brief sports training course before serving as a physical 
education teacher in Liaoning province, where he experienced a degree of success in 
coaching during the 1980s. Coach Ma was known for his sacrifice and dedication. For 
example, to assist in funding two athletes for the 1992 Olympics, Ma donated half of his 
annual salary. Additionally, he was also known for harsh training methods. On one 
occasion, for example, Ma stated, “I would scold and even beat them when they were 
lazy or disobedient, but I did this for their own good. If we were not prepared to suffer 
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pain how could we win world championships?”146 The Ma Family Army won a bronze 
medal at the 1988 Olympics, four gold medals at the 1992 Junior Championships, and as 
stated, a historic three gold medals at the 1993 IAAF World Championships. The data 
seemed to suggest a Confucian relationship of women’s hard work, determination, and 
obedience to a harsh, but sacrificing and dedicated coach could produce astounding 
success, but at closer examination, the data is more complex. For example, the Ma 
Family Army was suspected of PED usage as early as 1993, and in 2000, it was banned 
from the Chinese Olympic team. Further, in 1993, female athlete Liu Dong refused to 
lose to a teammate while openly disobeying Ma. By 2000, as athletes received 
sponsorships, bonuses, and endorsements, the Ma Family Army disbanded and Ma began 
promoting commercial products, such as turtle extract.147 Therefore, the story of the Ma 
Family Army, from the fragmented data, does seem to suggest a minor Confucian 
relationship between coach and athlete. However, primarily, it suggests the willingness of 
a coach and athletes—during the Deng Xiaoping and early Jiang Zemin reform eras, and 
in the absence of substantial PED testing—to cheat, sacrifice, and endure pain for quick 
athletic glory, celebrity status, and monetary accommodation.  
Another hypothesis asserts that Chinese female athletic success is a consequence 
of government and social policies that deter female societal advancement and encourage 
inequality. Women thus participate in athletics and achieve success because a male 
dominated society deters female advancement in business, politics, and academics. 
Chinese men have numerous career options while females have few. Women therefore 
need to succeed in athletics. This hypothesis also does not stand up. First, as stated, the 
data suggests that the majority of athletes from both genders were recruited before the 
age of 13. Almost all sports, with the exception of “strength” sports, such as 
weightlifting, “combat” sports, such as judo, and swimming, recruited over 50 percent, or 
almost 50 percent of their athletes before the age of 13.148 Historically, sports in China 
are both a young girl’s endeavor and a young boy’s endeavor, predominantly, decided by 
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recruitment rather than individual choice. The evidence suggests body composition may 
matter more than gender while business, politics, and academics is as foreign to a 13-
year-old girl recruited by the sports system as a 13-year-old boy. Therefore, the data 
indicate sports recruitment does not target women to keep them from business, politics, 
and academics. 
Second, the evidence suggests that the majority of boys and girls, if they 
possessed the maturity to choose their occupation, may have been, along with their 
parents, incentivized to choose sports. For example, as stated, CCP policies and the 
Chinese population’s embrace of sports made athletics a prestigious occupation that 
generously rewarded athletes while minimally rewarding academics. Further, with the 
majority of Chinese athletes from urban backgrounds with college-educated fathers, a 
career options assessment becomes more complex than athletes choosing professional 
sports because professional sports was the only choice, the only means to “freedom,” or 
the only method to escape inequality. Therefore, the “Single Option Hypothesis” 
becomes less useful as questions arise as to the ability of recruited individuals, boy or 
girl, truly to choose professional sports, and the complexity of career options in 
relationship to demographics and sport’s occupational incentivization. 
A final hypothesis stipulates that Chinese female athletic success results from 
government policies fostering admission, opportunity, equality, and general male support 
towards female athletics and female equality. This argument tends to be more useful. 
First, as mentioned, data consistently suggest that men and women were simultaneously 
populating the CCP’s educational and economic institutions under new gender equality 
ideologies that sought to alter traditional culture while concurrently exposing men and 
women to a hierarchical national sports system that invested in research, training, 
equipment, recruitment, and incentivizing athletes. For example, as gender equality laws 
allotted girls to attend schools in extraordinary numbers, girls became exposed to the 
State Education Commission bureaucracy connected to the NSC, and NSC resources and 
incentives, and elite female athletes increased in relationship to CCP investments. 
Further, as gender equality laws allotted women to participate in economic production in 
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extraordinary numbers, women became exposed to the ACFTU bureaucracy connected to 
the NSC, and elite female athletes increased in relationship to CCP investments.  
Second, male support for female athletics and equality are difficult to measure, 
but presupposing fostering equal representation is a measure of support or equality, sports 
may suggest a general male support or equality, or at a minimum elite male political 
support. For example, in the 1950s, the Soviet assisted shift from mass sports to elite 
sports coupled with the founding of the hierarchical NSC and the gender equality 
propaganda campaigns of the Marriage Law suggests that the CCP deliberately fostered 
women’s participation in national endeavors—including international sports. 
Additionally, since 1949, the percentage of female elite athletes among the Chinese elite 
athlete population has continued to increase even during periods of reduction in overall 
elite athlete population. Currently, the percentage of elite female athletes is nearly equal 
to the percentage of elite male athletes in China. Chinese men may or may not support 
comprehensive female equality—for example, national CCP political leadership does not 
illustrate the same nearly equal representation. However, professional athletics does 
appear to enjoy a degree of fostering equal representation or fostering female equality in 
sports.  
Notably, elements of the “CCP-Male Support Hypothesis” and the historical 
conclusions explains the rise and success of female athletics in China, and the rise of elite 
female athletic populations and representation in international competition. However, 
since 1949, the examination has argued, compelling data supporting a true difference in 
the female elite athlete production system and the male elite athlete production system is 
lacking. Therefore, the examination argues against claims of CCP favoritism regarding 
female athletics for national objectives at the expense of male athletics. The limits of an 
examination focused upon CCP policies is, if sports policies are essentially similar for 
both genders, the data can explain an internal rise and success, and suggest a strong link 
to international success, but cannot explain the success of one gender over the other in 
international competition. When women are experiencing more success than men in 
international competition under similar CCP policies than an element relating to a foreign  
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nation-states’ elite athlete production system exists. Therefore, women are succeeding 
more than men because of important CCP policies relating to equality and sports coupled 
with an unexamined element relating to a competitor’s policies.  
B. IMPLICATIONS 
Historically, academics studies have related international sport to national power 
and “self-image,” or the image a nation-state desires and has the ability to portray to the 
world. Occasionally, power and image relates to hosting sporting events like the 
Olympics, but additionally, power and image relates to the ability of a nation-state to 
succeed in competition. For example, if China desires a rising power image, China must 
possess the ability to produce rising success in sports competitions.149  
Second, academic studies have related international sport to the interconnected 
desires of nation-states as athletes travel, participate in sport federations like the IOC, and 
influence the world as they are influenced by the world.150 For example, “status quo” 
nation-states desire interconnectedness in established sport federations while “revisionist” 
nation-states desire isolationism or the establishment of competing sport federations.  
Third, academic studies have related international sport to national identity and 
patriotism. For example, when citizens rally behind flags, national athletes, and 
competitive successes, patriotism, national identity, and cohesion are formed.151 
Therefore, by reasonably presupposing international sport is a prism for national power 
and image, interconnectedness, patriotism, and identity, China’s policies and athletic 
success—linked to female athletic success—reveal an imbalanced and plateauing power, 
a nation-state that embraces a form of controlled interconnectedness, and likewise, a 
nation-state that embraces a form of controlled patriotism and national identity. 
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Notably, it is not necessary to prove that sports truly assist, or only assist national 
power, interconnectedness, and patriotism. National identity is not defined in a nuanced 
manner, but merely relates to assisting citizens to identify as Chinese through athletic 
success, or to the possible cohesion in identification through athletic success. Further, it is 
merely presupposed sports assist power, interconnectedness, and patriotism, while briefly 
providing possible implications based on historical evidence. For example, if sports assist 
a nation-state’s power through victories and hinders power through defeats, history shows 
China’s power has expanded, and in the future, it might be expect to plateau. 
As sports often reflect a nation-state’s power and image and the hybrid of a 
nation-state’s desires and abilities, CCP policies and the historical success of Chinese 
elite female athletes implies an imbalanced but rising power, while short-term future 
prospects imply China might be a declining or plateauing power-sports power.  
First, beyond the answered questions, or addressed accusations, for example, did 
the CCP systematically produce a more successful international female sports program to 
“medal grab?” Does the state invest more in female sports than male sports? Does China 
recruit more heavily for female sports? Historically, as shown, CCP policies have 
produced an exceptional rise in China’s Olympic success. Further, while producing more 
elite male athletes in China, CCP policies have consistently produced greater elite female 
athlete qualification, representation, and success in international competitions. As the 
data reveal, for nearly three decades, Chinese women have qualified more, are 
represented more, and experience more success in international competitions than men. 
Therefore, since 1984, the consistency of the data implies a rising but imbalanced system 
of sports production, or concisely, China’s power-sports power has been rising but is 
imbalanced. 
Second, the current data reveals that within China’s social system and hierarchical 
national sports systems where female athletic success is connected to Party investment, 
the CCP has begun to deal with the rising cost of sports through decentralization. Since 
the late 1980s, as the CCP has decentralized team sports, the success of elite national 
teams in international competition has diminished. Therefore, generally, the fate of sports 
decentralization in the Chinese social system is a diminishment of success and power. If 
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in the future China decentralizes individual sports, diminished success may be expected 
in Olympic competition—to include diminished female success. Primarily, 
decentralization implies a decrease in Chinese power and success in sports.  
Third, if the CCP does not decentralize individual sports, the data indicates a 
general plateauing of Chinese Olympic success due to the general plateauing of female 
athletics—the backbone of China’s Olympic success. Since 1992, on average, Chinese 
elite female athletes tend to represent 60 percent (plus or minus 4 percent) of the Olympic 
team and win 56 percent (plus or minus 4 percent) of Olympic gold medals—usually 
equating to about 18–20 gold medals. The 2004 and 2012 Olympics were perfect 
examples, as Chinese females comprised 64 and 57 percent of the team, and won 60 and 
54 percent of the gold medals, or 19.5 and 20.5 gold medals. Unless state investments in 
individual Olympic sports noticeably increases as the Chinese GDP decreases,152 or 
China is the Olympic host nation, the data reveals a general plateau in female success. 
For example, for nearly a decade, Chinese women have consistently won around 20 gold 
medals—enough for China to place second in most Olympics, but not enough to surpass 
the usual U.S. performance. Concisely, without more male success, or an unforeseen 
increase in female medal production, China is stuck in second place. The 2008 Beijing 
Olympics for China, like the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics for the United States, is the 
exception to the rule, or the exception to the mean. Therefore, an examination of CCP 
policies and Chinese elite female athletic success reveals a plateauing of female success 
and a general plateauing of China’s athletic success and sports power. 
As sports often reflect a nation-state’s level or desire of interconnectedness, CCP 
policies and the historical success of athletes reveal a form of controlled 
interconnectedness. The hierarchical CCP bureaucracy and the national sports system 
continually embrace and struggle with interconnectedness. For example, as stated, female 
athletic migration during economic reform and opening, and FINA pressure or 
infringement in PED testing during the 1990s; conversely, the Chinese lobbying for IOC 
admittance in the 1970s, the Chinese lobbying to host the Summer Olympics in the 1990s 
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and 2000s, and generally, China continually desiring representation in the Olympics and 
World Championships. In short, the evidence reveals that China both desires to 
participate in, and is wary of infringement by international athletic organizations—for 
example, the CCP fearing IOC opposition to censorship during the 2008 Olympics.  
However, beyond mere wariness, the CCP sports policies reveal a form of 
controlled interconnectedness through examining the differences in international athletic 
organizations and athletes. For example, as stated, Chinese Olympic athletes are 
supported, promoted, and sponsored by the Party, as athletes must earn money through 
the state and beyond the IOC. Conversely, elite “professional” athletes like Chinese 
female tennis player Li Na are not generally supported or promoted by the State because 
they are predominantly non-state-sponsored and can earn money through an association 
like the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) and private sponsorship. After Li Na’s 
historic 2011 French Open victory, the “Central Propaganda Department issued a news 
media directive ‘to stop hyping Li Na’s win.’”153 Thus, it is at this point that skepticism 
and controlled interconnectedness are magnified. If athletes are sponsored by the state, 
the Party supports their endeavors because the national sports system, through various 
forms of incentives, controls the athletes and China’s relationship to the International 
Organization (IO). If an athlete is a professional, the CCP is skeptical of that athlete’s 
endeavors because the national sports system does not control that athlete’s incentives 
and admission in, or interaction with an IO. Therefore, policies reveal an embrace of 
controlled interconnectedness, beyond mere athletic success and participation in 
international competition. Further, controlled interconnectedness implies China is neither 
a status quo nor revisionist power, neither an internationalist nor isolationist, but a power 
that desires participation, Party power, and citizen influence control that deters China 
from a full realization of its athletic abilities or successes. 
Similarly, as sports and success often reflect a nation-state’s level of patriotism 
and national identity, CCP policies reveal both an embracement and distrust of patriotism 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/sports/chinese-athletes-begin-to-challenge-governments-tight-
grip.html?pagewanted=all&_r=5&. 
  61 
and identity through sports, therefore, favoring a controlled patriotism and identity. For 
example, athletes supported a CCP embrace and manufacturing of patriotism and identity 
during the GLF to produce short-term athletic success. Arguably, athletes still support a 
CCP embrace and manufacturing of patriotism and identity. Conversely, in 1988, 
following China’s Olympic failures, a nationalistic backlash targeted the Party’s elite 
sports focus in favor of a more socialistic mass sports focus. Further, nationalism targeted 
CCP stability (and Hong Kong) in the 1985 5.19 Soccer Riot. Ultimately, both the 
Olympic backlash and soccer riot were suppressed by the state, and thus, distrust and 
control become magnified. In a hierarchical national sports system, failure and success 
(rightly and-or wrongly) are attributed to the system, therefore, causing moments of Party 
legitimacy as populations embrace patriotism, identity, and cohesion through victory, and 
moments of Party illegitimacy as patriotic citizens blame the CCP and the national sports 
system for failure. Therefore, state policies reveal an embracement of Party 
manufactured-controlled patriotism and identity, and a distrust of “decentralized” 
patriotism and national identity, or patriotism and national identity not manufactured by 
the CCP—ultimately, they reveal a level of distrust in Chinese citizens. Notably, if as 
stated, Chinese sports are plateauing, the patriotic implications may be troublesome for 
an “embracing and controlling” party. Citizens may search beyond state sponsored 
athletes and sports to “kindle the flames” of patriotism and identity while challenging 
CCP control, or the control of sports patriotism. An example was witnessed when U.S. 
professional basketball player Jeremy Lin, a Harvard educated Christian-Asian-American 
athlete of Taiwanese descent, ignited a Chinese following in 2012—“Linsanity” in 
China—through his basketball success and was a target for censorship.154 
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclusion, history generally reveals that Chinese elite female athletes were 
successful due to the CCP nurturing female representation in international competition 
through gender equality policies that targeted culture, education, military service, and 
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labor, while simultaneously exposing men and women to a hierarchical national sports 
system that invested in research, training, equipment, recruitment, and incentivizing 
athletes “to win honors for the country.”155 Additionally, although CCP policies can 
generally explain female success, an unexamined element relating to the competitor’s 
policies exists for future consideration. The principal implications have deduced, first, 
China’s system is imbalanced with plateauing power. Second, the Party embraces a form 
of controlled athletic interconnectedness that reveals China is neither a status quo nor 
revisionist power, and the CCP desires participation, power, and citizen control at the 
expense of broader athletic success. Last, the Party embraces a form of controlled 
patriotism while revealing distrust in Chinese citizens. Undoubtedly, the rise of Chinese 
female athletic participation and success in international competition, which has been the 
backbone for China’s rise to sports relevance, has been historic, but sports fans must wait 
to see if policies, female success, and the national sports system are sustainable. 
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